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Abstract
Small embedded devices are highly specialized platforms that integrate several pe-
ripherals alongside the CPU core. Embedded devices extensively rely on Firmware
(FW) to control and access the peripherals as well as other important functionality.
Customizing embedded computing platforms to specific application domains often
necessitates optimizing the firmware and/or the HW/SW interface under tight re-
source constraints. Such optimizations frequently alter the communication between
the firmware and the peripheral devices, possibly compromising functional correct-
ness of the input/output behavior of the embedded system. This poses challenges
to the development and verification of such systems. The system must be adapted
and verified to each specific device configuration.
This thesis presents a formal approach to formulate these verification tasks at
several levels of abstraction, along with corresponding HW/SW co-equivalence
checking techniques for verifying correct I/O behavior of peripherals under a
modified firmware. The feasibility of the approach is shown on several case studies,
including industrial driver software as well as open-source peripherals. In addition,
a subtle bug in one of the peripherals and several undocumented preconditions for
correct device behavior were detected by the verification method.
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“Our civilization runs on software.”
(Bjarne Stroustrup)
1.1 The History of Embedded Systems Design
Computer applications serve as the basis for modern scientific research, contribute
to solving engineering problems, assist in decision making in business, and are
often the key factor that differentiates modern products and services. By now,
software and small scale computing systems are an integral part in every-day
human activities, many times without us giving it much thought. Yet, the fields
of computer science and engineering are still very young compared to most other
scientific fields.
Every modern computer, as we know it, is based on the principles first described
by Alan Turing in his 1936 paper On Computable Numbers [1]. The first actual
realization of these principles – the ’First Generation’ computers – were probably
Konrad Zuse’s Z2 (1940), the British Colossus (1943) and the Harvard Mk I (1944).
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For today’s standards they were electro-mechanical monstrosities, consisting of
electrical relays, vacuum tubes and mechanical memories, such as punch cards;
weighing dozens of tons and consuming thousands of watts of electrical power.
The ’Second Generation’ dominated the late 1950s and early 1960s and was marked
by the invention of the transistor in 1947 at Bell Labs. The transistor proved to
be a much smaller and more reliable replacement for the inefficient vacuum tubes.
Yet, a computer of the second generation remained to be of considerable size and
cost, restricting it still to the domain of universities and governments.
This changed with the invention of the integrated circuit, commencing the ’Third
Generation’ of computing. While this inherently increased storage and processing
capabilities, the integrated circuit allowed the development of small-scale com-
puters that began to bring computing to many smaller businesses. Large-scale
integration of circuits finally enabled the development of very small processing
units – embedded systems, such as flight data analyzers in the US Navy’s F14A
’TomCat’ fighter jet.
In 1971, the release of the world’s first commercial microprocessor, Intel’s 4004,
announced the start of the ’Fourth Generation’. Originally, microprocessors were
very limited in their computational ability and speed, and were in no way an attempt
to downsize the mainframe computers common at the time, but targeted an entirely
different market. Accommodating much of the computer’s processing abilities
on a single chip, along with other inventions, such as Random Access Memory
(RAM), drastically cut down cost. This did not only allow for the development of
personal computers that were small and cheap enough to be available to ordinary
people, but led to the omnipresence of embedded systems. It is widely regarded that
most of today’s computers still belong to the fourth generation, as the underlying
technology remains fundamentally the same.
Through improvements in architecture design and the level of integration, comput-
ers have become extraordinarily more sophisticated, more efficient and faster. Yet,
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they haven’t become any more “powerful” – after all, they are at most a Universal
Turing Machine (UTM), adhering to the same principles and restrictions as their
ancestors. One of these principles is the distinction of the physical components
of the computing system, i.e., the hardware, and the executed program, the soft-
ware. So far only the development of the hardware has been portrayed, but the
development of software is inseparably connected to it.
In the days of first-generation computers, our understanding of software did not
yet exist. Initially, changing the program of those devices meant to manually
rewire the hardware. This changed when Claude Shannon [2] explained how
binary logic could be used to program a computer. Henceforth, the program could
be represented as a long string of bits, the values of which were mechanically
represented through holes on punch cards. This was, understandably, a process
very prone to errors.
This was rather quickly supplanted by the introduction of assembly languages.
The use of mnemonics and the use of an assembler greatly improved software
quality by freeing the programmer from remembering numeric codes and calcu-
lating addresses. Yet, it didn’t free the programmer from needing to have a very
close understanding of the underlying hardware because machine languages and
the corresponding assembly languages tend to be unique to a particular type of
computer architecture.
High-level languages such as Fortran, COBOL and BASIC eventually allowed
programmers to specify the software in an abstract way that was independent
of the precise details of the hardware architecture of the computer. Since high-
level languages are more abstract than assembly language, it is possible to use
different compilers to translate the same high-level language program into the
machine language of many different types of computers. This further improved
programming productivity greatly. Nevertheless, assembly languages remained
highly relevant well into the 1990s, as their code was generally of smaller size,
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with less overhead and executing at higher speed than the one produced by the
high-level equivalents. This can be traced back mainly to the limited performance
of high-level language compilers.
Today, assembly code might still be found in device drivers and low-level embedded
software, but even there the further usefulness and performance of assembly
language relative to high-level languages is still an ongoing debate.
Embedded Software is a short-hand term for “Software of an Embedded System”
where an Embedded System is a computing system that is "embedded" into a
larger system or process. Embedded software is typically designed to perform
one specific function, although a single piece of hardware may contain multiple
pieces of software embedded in it. Embedded systems often use operating systems
tailored to embedded use or they run the application software directly on ’bare
metal’, i.e., without an operating system, particularly where real-time operating
criteria apply. Depending on the specific use case, slight variations in reaction time
close to that of real-time approaches might still be acceptable.
The term firmware initially referred to the lower-level microcode involved in the
implementation of machine instructions. It existed on the boundary between
hardware and software; thus the name “firmware”. Over time, popular usage
extended the meaning of word “firmware” to denote a subset of a system’s software
that is a ’firm’ part of the system. This subset is stored in some form of non-volatile
read-only memory (ROM) and takes care of system-critical actions that are tightly
linked to hardware, such as processor machine instructions for BIOS, bootstrap
loaders, or the control systems for simple electronic devices such as a microwave
oven, remote control, or computer peripherals.
The development of easily reprogrammable non-volatile memory, such as flash,
enabled easy updates and bug fixes, making firmware less ’firm’ and somewhat
mutable. On the other hand, embedded software is designed to fulfill a clearly
defined task over the course of its lifetime.
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Hence, the delineation between the terms embedded firmware and embedded
software is blurring.
’Ordinary’ software for desktop computer environments can be run on the target
platform alongside separate debugger applications monitoring the behavior of
the development code as it is executed. The often highly limited resources of an
embedded system do not allow to do this on the respective hardware. Running
the embedded software directly on the development platform, i.e., a desktop PC,
doesn’t work, because its behavior often depends on the system’s underlying
hardware architecture.
One approach is to run the embedded software on the system and use specialized
debugging ports, e.g., JTAG to communicate with a debugger on a separate com-
puting platform. Another, frequently used approach is to emulate the physical
chip as a virtual prototype (VP), thus making it possible to debug the software
as if it was running on the actual hardware. This offers a lot more controllability
and observability than debugging over debugging ports, but at the cost of reduced
execution speed (due to the overhead of emulation). Furthermore, debugging on a
VP might be the only option if the hardware itself is still under development.
Broadly speaking, embedded systems require more attention to testing and debug-
ging because a great number of devices using embedded controls are critical for
safety. People often leave their welfare, security, and their decisions in the hands
of a software application. The reliability of these devices is, hence, of utmost
importance
However, software testing rarely – if ever – eliminates every bug; this gave rise to
Lubarsky’s Law of Cybernetic Entomology:
“There is always one more bug.”
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1.2 Motivation and Overview
Continuously growing demands for computing applications in the domain of Inter-
net of Things (IoT) open new opportunities for embedded system technology but,
at the same time, increase the already existing pressure of tight resource constraints
on embedded computing platforms. Many of the visions of the IoT domain can only
become reality if the needed devices have extremely low design and production
costs (< 1 $/device), yet, they must be highly efficient for the targeted application.
Most nodes in an IoT network consist of rather small devices and provide a well-
defined set of very specific functionalities. Hence, their development profile is
similar to that of an embedded system.
Designing an embedded system involves the integration of numerous sub-systems
in both hardware and software. Modern computing platforms usually include a mul-
titude of peripheral devices through which they communicate with the environment,
such as sensors, actuators or more general communication infrastructures.
The embedded system’s software itself might again consist of many components,
such as operating systems, middleware and device drivers, as well as software
specifically developed for the embedded application.
A common strategy to address cost requirements is to use commercial off-the-shelf
products and available hardware Intellectual Property (IP), such as microcontroller
platforms, which require no or only minimal further hardware design effort. The
desired device functionality is then implemented in software by reusing existing
software IP and generic libraries. This successfully reduces design effort and costs.
Then, however, the project often fails to meet important non-functional design tar-
gets such as low power consumption and short execution time due to the inefficient
utilization of the hardware platform resources by the generic software.
A large portion of an embedded system’s chip area is consumed by memory, even
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more so when relying on software to implement a functionality which otherwise
would be implemented by dedicated hardware. One way to reduce the required
instruction memory lies in optimizing and unifying the hardware/software inter-
faces for the peripherals of the system. On the software side, this interface is
usually implemented using memory mapped I/O in a number of access methods
for each of the system’s various peripherals. Unifying these methods, if possible,
enables reusing one instance of code for multiple peripheral devices, but may
change the I/O behavior of the software to a given device, e.g., by now using a
different order or number of load/store accesses. When compared with arithmetic
instructions, load/store operations are more expensive w.r.t. the energy budget, as
their execution always involves some action by secondary hardware (bus systems,
network bridges, memory etc.) and might make energy saving schemes like sleep
modes less effective. Therefore, customizing a computing platform usually entails
a number of firmware optimizations concerning the access and communication
structures between hardware and software.
Interactions between the hardware and software components are often complex.
In many cases they require strict sequences of actions that need to follow certain
rules and comply with environmental constraints. Often, these access constraints
and preconditions are not documented, but nevertheless required by the device
hardware or the involved bus systems. On top of possibly leading the application
software developer into making wrong assumptions about the usage of already
existing IP, it further complicates optimizations of the hardware/software interface.
In general, these optimizations cannot be performed by a compiler because of its
lack of detailed knowledge about the system’s hardware. Instead, the firmware
developer or hardware designer makes such adjustments manually when customiz-
ing the platform. Changes to the hardware/software interface, as considered in
this thesis, in fact constitute an optimization step that takes place after the regular
optimizations performed by the compiler or by other general optimizations methods
for firmware.
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The class of optimizations considered here typically leads to local modifications of
the I/O behavior of the program but does not change its global control flow. Yet,
the considered optimizations pose significant challenges to designers and software
developers. They may easily compromise the functional correctness of the I/O
behavior of the embedded system, for example, by triggering unanticipated side
effects in the hardware. As a response, the driver or the hardware device may move
into an unexpected or undefined state, which in turn can lead to a failure of the
whole system. Hence, even though the modifications are locally contained, their
verification remains a challenging task.
It is apparent from the previous discussion that any notion of equivalence which
only takes the software into account, even when hardware-dependent software
models are used, cannot be appropriate to solve this verification problem. Since
programs with different I/O behavior are compared, their equivalence can only
be stated by considering, also, their effect on the hardware. In the general case,
verification of the considered firmware optimizations would require to prove the
hardware/software co-equivalence modulo latency over the entirety of the system
for as many clock cycles as needed to cover the overall run time of the software.
This is an invincibly complex task for realistic applications.
This thesis discusses a new formal approach to this problem which can be feasible
in many practical settings. It is based on the observation that the complexity of the
proof task can be reduced drastically by exploiting the specific characteristics of
the optimization scenario described above.
By utilizing the locality of induced changes, the thesis proposes a formal approach
where the cycle-accurate proof for the peripheral can be partitioned. In each local
partition the global context of the complete program is still taken into account
in a time-abstract fashion. By over-approximating the initial state space of the
peripheral for each partition to be considered, we can conduct a series of cycle-
accurate local proofs, each spanning over relatively small time intervals, whereas
8
1.3. Publication List
the equivalence of the entire system follows as a compositional result from the
equivalence of all segments examined in this way.
This work is organized as follows: Chap. 2 briefly introduces relevant concepts for
the further understanding of this work and discusses research which is related or of
interest to the area of HW/SW-Co-verification. It is followed by the presentation
of the central verification methodology and its models as proposed by this thesis in
Chap. 3. The feasibility of the presented method, along with other performance data,
is shown by several experiments and case studies in Chap. 4. The thesis continues
in Chap. 5 with a supplementary procedure extending the central verification
method with cycle accurate timing information of the software. Finally, Chap. 6
summarizes the findings presented in this work.
1.3 Publication List
Large parts of this thesis have already been published in the publications listed
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2017.
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Vegas, NV, USA, 2019.
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This chapter gives a broad overview of core concepts employed in the models
and the verification approach presented in the subsequent chapters. The goal is to
provide sufficient information to enable understanding of the techniques presented
in this work without going into the details of the respective background concept.
2.1 Verification of Embedded Systems
This section provides information on mathematical concepts, algorithms and mod-
els used in the context of formal verification.
2.1.1 Integer Linear Programming
Linear programming (LP) addresses the task of maximizing or minimizing a linear
functional over a polyhedron. Integer linear programming (ILP) is a specialized
form of LP in which some variables are restricted to integers. It is called pure if
the restriction applies to all variables [3]. Formally, an ILP problem is given by:
min {cᵀx |Ax ≤ b; x ∈ Zdim(x)} (2.1)
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with A being the constraint matrix and b, c, x being vectors determining bounds,
cost and variables, respectively.
The general ILP problem is proven to be NP-complete, indicating that for larger
problem instances complexity may become a problem. Yet, many powerful solvers
exist – both free and commercial – that are capable of handling millions of vari-
ables of constraints. This is sufficient for many practical tasks, e.g., the timing
computation presented in Chap. 5.
2.1.2 The Satisfiability Problem
Many problems occurring in Electronic Design Automation (EDA) can be mapped
to the Boolean Satisfiability Problem (SAT). In this thesis, proofs of properties
and equivalence checks are performed by reducing them to instances of the SAT
problem. Although solving those problems is an integral part of the approaches
presented in this thesis, the technical details on how to solve them is a field of
research of its own and well out of the scope of this work. While solving those
problems is an integral part of the approaches presented in this thesis, the way
in which they are solved is not. Hence, this work relies on standard approaches
employed by available solver engines. Therefore, only a brief introduction of SAT
is provided. For more in-depth information, please refer to [4].
The goal of SAT is to answer the question whether for a given Boolean formula
f(x1, ..., xn) a variable assignment A = x1, ..., xn exists such that f(A) evaluates
to true. If so, A is called a satisfying assignment and f is satisfiable. Otherwise, if
there is no satisfying assignment, f is said to be unsatisfiable.
SAT was the first problem to be shown to be NP-complete [5]. Even though
many of the instances that occur in practical applications can be solved much more
quickly, it is still highly advisable to keep the instance of the problem as concise as
possible.
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Reducing a problem to SAT is widely applied in formal verification. It is one of
the basic working principles of model checking (see Sec. 2.1.3) and the generation
of program netlists (see Sec. 2.1.4).
2.1.3 Model Checking
Model checking is a formal method of verifying the correctness of a given system,
i.e., whether the system adheres to a given specification. In order to do so, all
parts involved in model checking must be translated into an adequate formal
representation. The behavior of the design is usually given by a sequential model,
e.g., a finite-state machine or Kripke model. How a digital circuit can be formalized
as a sequential model is elaborated in Sec. 2.1.3.1. The system’s specification is
formalized by a set of desired properties expressed in temporal logic. Hence, model
checking is also known as property checking. Note that a property is not restricted
to asserting the existence of wanted behavior, but can also show the absence of
undesired behavior.
Together, the sequential model and the property set, pose the task of proving
whether all properties are satisfiable on the model. The combination of a the
sequential model with a single property forms a computational model which a
model checker attempts to solve using logic reasoning. This differentiates model
checking from coverage-driven verification methods such as simulation that employ
stimuli and assert an expected response.
Model checking is used for both hardware verification and software verification.
Most model checking tools provide front ends for common hardware description
languages (e.g., VHDL and Verilog) and common software programming lan-
guages. In industry, model checking for software is not quite as popular as for
hardware because the inherent possibility of undecidability in software may require
further information or involvement of an expert.
The properties are formulated in specific property languages such as the Property
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Specification Language (PSL) [6], System Verilog Assertions (SVA) [7] or the
Interval Temporal Logic Language (ITL) [8].
Model checking is an umbrella term encompassing various different techniques.
Within the scope of this work the concept of Interval Property Checking (IPC)
plays an important role. Its basic principles are detailed in Sec. 2.1.3.2.
2.1.3.1 Sequential model
Digital circuits can be categorized as either sequential or combinational. A circuit
is combinational if its output is a pure function of its current input. Hence, its
functionality can be represented by Boolean logic. In contrast, the output of a
sequential circuit additionally depends on the sequence of prior inputs which is
encoded by an internal state stored in some form. This cannot be expressed by
Boolean logic alone but requires the formalisms described by automata theory,
such as state machines or transition systems. In these formalisms, the internal state
of the circuit is conceptualized by an abstracted state, often defined by a predicate,
which changes according to certain events.
The most common form of visualization is the state transition graph (STG), a
directed graph G = {V,E}, with V being a set of vertices in which each vertex
corresponds to a single abstract state, and with E ⊆ V × V being the set of edges
between those vertices, according to the possible transitions in the automaton. Due
to this representation as a graph, many terms used in graph theory also apply in the
context of automata, such as:
• Path: A finite or infinite sequence of edges P = {e1, e2, ..., en−1} ⊆ E
connecting a sequence of vertices W = {v1, ..., vn} ⊆ V on a graph G =
{V,E}, such that each vertex in W is distinct.
• Reachable state: A state sR for which a path P = sstart → sR beginning at
a starting state exists, i.e., it is reachable from the set of initial states.
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• Sequential depth: The sequential depth of an automaton is equivalent to the
maximum eccentricity among initial states. In this context, the eccentricity of
a node is defined as the maximum distance to any other node. The distance
between to nodes, in turn, is the minimum number of edges of any path
between these nodes. Note that this is not equal to the diameter of G, which
is the maximum eccentricity among all vertices, not just the ones in the set
of initial states.
2.1.3.2 Interval Property Checking
IPC [9] is a SAT-based model checking technique, rooted in the industrial develop-
ments of the 1990s and closely related to Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [10].
A BMC problem considers a specific starting state and looks at a time interval of
length k, by unrolling the sequential model from the starting state into a combina-
tional circuit for k clock cycles. This problem can be efficiently mapped to SAT
and solved by respective solvers. The underlying principle of BMC is to search
for a counterexample to the examined property within that bounded time interval.
If no bug is found, then one increases k until either a bug is found, the problem
becomes intractable, or some preset upper bound is reached.
If this upper bound is smaller than the sequential depth of the examined system
some part of the reachable state space will not be considered. In this case a proof
verifying a property is incomplete and holds true only for the bounded interval.
Extending the interval beyond the sequential depth, is, in most cases, not feasible
due to the computational complexity of the SAT problem as well as the complexity
of calculating the sequential depth in the first place.
Hence, because it is much more efficient in disproving (falsifying) a property, i.e.,
finding a counterexample that violates a property, rather than in proving (verifying)
it, BMC is mostly seen as a formal technique for bug hunting.
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In contrast to bounded model checking, IPC is able to produce globally valid,
unbounded proofs. It shares the same computational model as BMC, with one
significant difference: The starting state is not fixed but is an arbitrary state defined
by a predicate P .
If it is shown that an IPC property ϕ starting from such an arbitrary state described
by P will always end in a state satisfying P , then P characterizes an invariant.
Hence, a proof verifying ϕ holds unbounded, i.e., it is valid not only for the
examined finite time interval, but for an arbitrary large time frame.
Because the property ϕ describes behavior over a finite time interval it is also
known as an interval property.
Definition 1 (Interval Property). An interval property ϕ is a LTL formula of the
form G (A → C) where both sub-formulas A and C, referred to as assumption
and commitment, respectively, describe behavior over a finite time, i.e., the only
temporal operator that may be used is the next operator, X.
Fig. 2.1 shows, conceptually, the computational model for an interval property ϕ
for a time interval of length three. The sequential model is unrolled over the length
of the interval, i.e., for each timepoint (cycle) in the interval, a new instance of
its combinational logic is created and added to the computational model. The
registers of the sequential model, which form its state variables, are cut from the
combinational model. Instead the values which would be stored are propagated to
the following instance of combinational logic. The starting state si is determined
by the predicate P , which in turn is part of the assumption A. The result is a single
combinational circuit representing the behavior of the sequential model over the
given time interval.
This is now easily mapped to SAT, which searches for a set of values X =
{xi, ..., xk} that satisfies the negation of the commitmentC under the assumptionA.
If such a set exists, ϕ is disproved, with X being a counterexample of the property.
16





( λ ,   )
yt+2
combinational circuit
( λ ,   )
yt+3
combinational circuit




counterexIf counterex nevertrue Φ |= Model
Figure 2.1: Proof computation for interval properties
Otherwise, the property is valid.
Proofs by IPC are conservative. The procedure never produces false positives,
i.e., the procedure never erroneously reports a a property φ to hold if a state in P
exists that violates the property . If P over-approximates the actual reachable
state space of the sequential model, false negatives may occur and lead to spurious
counterexamples. This can be mitigated by providing a strengthened invariant
for the design, either by manually inspecting the design and providing additional
assertions, or by automatic methods as proposed in [11].
2.1.4 Program Netlist
This work considers low-level driver software interacting with hardware. This calls
for a computational model with a path-oriented program view, as it is common in
Hardware (HW)-independent software verification. At the same time, the model
must be easy to integrate with the models for the interacting hardware and must
provide precise information about the effects of the executed software onto the
hardware. In light of these requirements we chose to represent the software as
a Program Netlist (PN) [12, 13]. This model represents all execution paths in a
hardware-dependent way. Syntactically, the PN is a combinational circuit, which
makes it easy to integrate the model with actual hardware to examine the combined
behavior.
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The following is a short overview of the PN generation technique; for further
details, the reader is referred to the original literature [12, 13].
Starting point of model generation is the extraction of the Control Flow Graph
(CFG) of the software from the program’s machine code or assembler code, which
is defined as a connected graphG = (V,E) with a set of nodes V and a set of edges
E ⊆ V ×V . While in the usual definition the nodes of a CFG represent basic blocks
they, here, represent machine instructions. A machine instruction is a pair (a, w)
of an instruction address a and the instruction word w stored at that address in the
program memory. There is an edge (vi, vj) between two instructions vi and vj , if
the program can make a transition from vi to vj . The CFG is then unrolled into the
Execution Graph (EXG) from which, in turn, the PN is synthesized. The PN is a
combinatorial circuit representing all possible executions of the program.
For example, a loop is unrolled until the loop end condition is reached. An
additional Boolean-valued signal called active is propagated by the instructions
which allows a SAT solver to keep track of the active execution path in the program
under the current set of value assignments in the SAT instance.
The SAT solver is used to check whether there exist executions where the active
flag of the loop-back branch can (still) become active. Similarly, branch destination
addresses can be computed on the incomplete program netlist to trace the actual
flow of control in the program.
These two steps are not taken one after the other, but instead are carried out in an
interleaved fashion. The incomplete program netlist, while it is being built, is used
to control the unrolling of the execution graph. Fig. 2.2 illustrates this process.
An important component of the model building process is the merging of nodes
in the execution graph. Whenever the control flow modeled in an unrolled path
segment reaches a previously visited program location, a node merging might be
possible. Instead of immediately creating a new node, the last node is tentatively
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Figure 2.2: Generating a program netlist
connected to the existing one for that location. Provided that this does not in-
troduce a cycle in the graph, the connection is made permanent. Otherwise, the
nodes are disconnected and a connection to a newly created node is made. These
intermittently performed checks for a possible merging of paths keep the model
compact by sharing of sub-graphs.
Hence, the provided EXG is a directed acyclic graph (rather than a tree) containing
information about
• all possible execution paths,
• all possible input/output access sequences to peripheral hardware compo-
nents and to shared memory,
• the address spaces reached by every instruction, and




In the overarching context of digital circuits, the term timing analysis is only
loosely defined and can actually refer to a multitude of things. For instance, the
probably most common notion associated is that of static timing analysis [14, 15],
which is used to compute the delay of signals in a combinational circuit. This is
important in order to identify the circuit’s critical path, i.e., the path between an
input and an output with the maximum delay. Only then can it be assured that the
circuit is able to operate at the required speed of a specified operating clock signal.
Hence, static timing analysis is an essential step in logic synthesis widely used in
respective EDA tools.
Another form of timing analysis more relevant to the proposed approaches is that
of Worst Case Execution Time (WCET) computation of a particular software. The
problem of correctly computing upper/lower bounds of the timing behavior of
software is an entire sub-field of research and an extensive body of work already
exists on the subject. An overview of various methods and tools can be found
in [16]. In the following, only a brief overview of WCET computation and the
problems posed by it is given.
The WCET is defined as the maximum time span required by a task to complete its
execution on a specific hardware platform. It is typically used in real-time systems,
where knowing the WCET of software is fundamental for choosing and realizing a
suitable scheduling scheme that ensures correct and timely functional behavior.
The general case for computing a WCET can be mapped to the halting problem
and is, therefore, undecidable. Fortunately, most applications for which computing
a WCET is required are typically structured in a way that guarantees that they
terminate, e.g., by prohibiting the use of recursion and enforcing upper bounds on
loop iterations. Broadly, methods of WCET computation can be grouped into two
classes: static and measurement-based methods.
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Figure 2.3: Core components of static WCET timing analysis according to [16]
Static methods do not rely on executing code on real hardware or simulating it,
but rather combine the task code with an (abstract) model of the system. Bounds
are then obtained solely by reasoning on this combination. The necessary core
components of such methods are shown in Fig. 2.3. The method proposed later on
in Chap. 5 falls in the category of static methods.
Measurement-based methods on the other hand are based on information obtained
by observing the timing behavior of the software over a series of executions or
simulation runs. This category comes with its own set of advantages, such as no
need to formalize the behavior of the executing hardware platform (i.e., creating
an abstract model), and disadvantages, e.g., more expensive setups and needing to
find suitable input vectors to provoke a WCET response, when compared to static
methods.
There are many factors contributing to the complexity in finding the WCET of a
program. The ones with the most impact are:
• Data-Dependent Control Flow: A program’s WCET is determined by the
longest possible execution path within it. Usually, this path depends on
the right initial conditions of the executing hardware and is only taken if
a specific sequence of input values is provided during the execution of
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the program. Determining this set of input values is a very hard task and
equivalent to solving the WCET problem. Hence, the starting point of most
static timing analysis methods is the construction of a CFG. Depending on
the size of the analyzed program and the required accuracy this is done either
from source code or machine code. A CFG describes a superset of the set
of all execution paths, i.e., some paths described by the CFG will never be
taken, e.g., due to contradictory consecutive conditions. Furthermore, a CFG
may remain incomplete due to dynamic jumps and dynamic calls whose
target address is computed during runtime. Eliminating infeasible paths,
completing the CFG and determining upper bounds on loops are necessary
precursors of a sufficiently precise timing analysis.
• Context Dependence of Execution Times: Early approaches to the timing-
analysis problem assumed the independence of the timing behavior from
prior context, i.e., the execution times in terms of clock cycles for individual
instructions were fixed, independent of the execution history, and could
usually be found in the processor’s specification. However, with the ubiquity
of modern architecture features this independence from context is mostly lost.
Due to a pipelined execution of instructions in the processor the execution
time of individual instructions is a function of possibly all instructions
currently processed by the pipeline. Furthermore, different paths taken
before the execution of an analyzed code section may lead to different cache
states, resulting in different timing due to the cache’s hit/miss behavior. Thus,
the execution time of a code snippet can depend heavily on the context from
which it is executed. Ignoring to consider this context during analysis will
result in imprecisely computed timings. Hence, it is necessary to analyze
the executing hardware’s behavior w.r.t. factors influencing a program’s
execution time and incorporate them in the abstract model.
• Timing Anomalies: Timing anomalies are counter-intuitive effects on the
overall execution time caused by timing variations of local sub-task, e.g.,
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reducing a sub-task’s execution time can actually slow down the task on a
global scale. Usually, timing anomalies result from the complexity of the
processor stemming from specific architecture features, such as speculative
execution, caches and multiple functional units working in parallel.
2.3 Abstraction Layers
The process of abstraction is used pervasively in common sense reasoning and
thus, most people have, in all probability, a certain understanding of it. Yet,
for the sake of disambiguation and in order to emphasize certain aspects and
consequences of the process, a discussion might be necessary. The meaning of
the term abstraction varies to some degree, depending on the respective context
in which it is utilized. This is mainly determined by the specific field of interest,
such as art, mathematics, philosophy or computer science. While the specifics in
those might be slightly different, abstraction as a process will further be treated
as the action of factoring out unnecessary details, identifying relevant similarities
between objects and synthesizing those facts into a concept or class. Such a concept
acts then as a super-categorical noun for all subordinate concepts, and connects any
related concepts as a group, field, or category. Roughly speaking, one can think
of abstraction as the process which allows us to consider what is relevant and to
forget many irrelevant details which would get in the way trying to do something.
Ironically, reducing the characteristic of abstraction in this particular way already
constitutes an abstraction by itself.
Especially noteworthy in the previous definition are the terms relevant, unnecessary
and/or irrelevant. The interpretation of them is the sole guideline of the abstraction
process, thus effectively determining its course and outcome. Unfortunately, this
interpretation highly depends on the targeted use of the concepts. Therefore,
abstraction is a task that can only be performed manually, due to the inability




Particular abstractions have proven to be especially useful during the design and
verification of computing systems. The following sub-chapters address those
relevant for the understanding of the remainder of this work.
2.3.1 Software
According to [17], the earliest use of the term software as we understand it today,
goes back to “The Teaching of Concrete Mathematics” [18] from 1958. Therein,
software is used to refer to "carefully planned interpretive routines, compilers, and
other aspects of automative programming", in contrast to the “hardware of tubes,
transistors, wires, tapes, and the like".
Since then, software has become an indispensable layer of abstraction for the
processes performed in hardware, without which the complexity of modern tasks
and systems could not be managed.
2.3.1.1 Machine Code & Assembly
Machine code, sometimes also called binary code, is a string of bits located in
memory and is the most elementary representation of a computer program. By itself,
i.e., without the hardware or knowledge about the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA)
it was compiled for, machine code carries no intrinsic meaning. The respective
ISA defines what sequence of bits form a valid instruction and what each bit or
group of bit in this instruction encodes.
While it is possible to write a program directly in machine code, doing so is a
tedious and highly error-prone process.
This process is made somewhat more manageable by an ISA’s assembly language,
which defines mnemonics for instructions and registers and often allows to define
labels in the code. While the mnemonics make the code human-readable and labels
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shift some responsibility of computing jump addresses to the compiler, code in
assembly is essentially a one-to-one representation of the resulting bit string. There
is only a low level of abstraction between the two. Programming in assembly
remains, especially in comparison with using high level languages, an arduous
task.
Hence, human programmers rarely, if ever, deal directly with machine code any-
more, most likely trying to streamline a code section that is especially critical
for the performance of the overall system. There is an ongoing debate over the
effectiveness of this practice compared to modern compilers.
Nevertheless, binary code (or the more readable assembly) remain an important
abstraction layer, as every higher programming language must be translated to
it by a compiler or an interpreter prior to execution. This is important in the
context of co-verification of hardware/software systems. As established at the
beginning of this chapter, an abstract representation of something is stripped of
information that is deemed unnecessary for its intended application. High-level
languages (see Sec. 2.3.1.2), specify "what" should be done by the processor at
the hardware level, but not the "how". The "how" is determined during translation
by a compiler and will usually differ between different compilers, their version or
the used configuration. Those small differences in program execution at the binary
level might trigger different behavior in some part of the hardware, which could
not be observed simply by analyzing the high-level code.
2.3.1.2 High-level Languages
A high-level programming language distinguishes itself from a low-level program-
ming language by a strong abstraction from the implementation details of the
computer. The underlying idea is to leverage this abstraction to provide constructs,
concepts and paradigms which make a program easier to understand. This, in turn,
dramatically simplifies the development process of the program when compared to
writing it in a low-level languages, i.e., assembly.
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Which language qualifies as being a high-level one, depends on the perspective of
the user and what it is compared against, because "strong abstraction" is a relative
term. For example, one could argue that the C language is not a high-level language,
as it does not provide features commonly attributed to one, such as support of
object orientation or automatic memory management. While it is not as abstract as
its successor/extension C++ or Java, it provides much more abstraction than the
previously discussed assembly. Hence, it should be clear that there are different,
not clearly separated, levels of "high-level" languages.
For the sake of this thesis, a high-level programming language is any language
that may use natural language elements, has a grammar that is defined or at least
expressible in extended Backus-Naur form and most importantly has few, if any,
language elements that translate directly into a machine’s native instructions.
This detachment of high-level source code from actual machine code is one of
the major contributors in the productivity gained by using high-level languages,
but leads potentially to sub-optimal code or unexpected data movements. This
is sometimes known as abstraction penalty. To bridge the gap between high-
level source code and machine code and reduce the abstraction penalties concepts
like abstract machines and compiler optimization are common tools in software
development.
2.3.1.3 Software Concepts and Artifacts
Abstract & Concrete Machine To more easily explain the concept of an abstract
machine, it is helpful to first understand the term of a real or concrete machine.
The term concrete machine is often used to represent the machine code of a given
program. Hence, the goal of compilation is to derive an efficient concrete machine
from the given high-level source code. An abstract machine is an intermediate
concept used in program compilation to bridge the gap between those two levels.
In many cases, e.g., for the languages of C/C++, the abstract machine does not exist.
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The machine is literally abstract in the sense of existing in thought only. It is a an
imaginary machine which precisely follows the rules of the C language definition
standard [19], whereas a concrete machine might have unforeseen semantics, due
to features like speculative execution, out-of-order execution and parallelism. The
abstract machine serves as reference for the adherence, i.e., correctness, of a
concrete machine w.r.t. the standard of the respective high-level language.
Some compilers or compiler frameworks, e.g., LLVM, create an abstract machine
as an intermediate step in the compilation process [20]. This abstract machine
already resembles the machine code of the program in that it enables a step-by-step
execution of the program at the granularity of single instructions and works using a
limited set of general purpose registers and a program counter. Yet, the instructions
still omit many of the details of the actual hardware and are not particular to any
specific ISA [21]. The abstract machine serves as a platform for most hardware-
independent optimization performed by the compiler.
Compiler Optimization Software optimization in general is the process of
modifying or reorganizing parts of a program in a way that it is more efficient w.r.t.
the use of a certain resource. That resource is most often execution time, but also
includes a program’s memory footprint or energy consumption. Many of these
aspects are correlated, i.e., they are not independent from each other. The nature of
these correlations is not easily determined. They depend on many facets such as
the degree and form of a specific optimization and the underlying hardware system.
For example, inline expansion (or simply "inlining"), i.e., explicit insertion of a
function’s code at the location from where it was called, results generally in faster
execution times due to a lower degree of indirection in the code, but increases the
program’s memory footprint, if the function is also called from elsewhere in the
program. Both aspects, in turn, influence the system’s energy consumption. The
faster execution time might affect it positively, because less instructions need to
be executed and there is more potential for power saving schemes. More memory
usage usually results in higher energy consumption, but depends largely on the
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actual access patterns of the software. The spacial locality principle in combination
of a correctly sized cache might actually lead to a positive effect. As a result, it
is usually not possible to optimize all aspects of a program at once. Instead, one
aspect is given priority.
Optimizations can be classified by their dependency on details of the executing
hardware, i.e., as hardware-dependent or hardware-independent, as well as the
scope in which the optimization takes place.
The optimization techniques which rely solely on the abstract machine are, per
definition, independent of implementation details of the machine targeted by the
compiler. Yet, those leave a lot of optimization potential untapped, as many of the
most effective optimizations exploit special features of the target platform. For
example, using Thumb™mode in many ARM architectures or the compressed
instruction format in RISC-V architectures can dramatically reduce code size.
Typical scopes for optimization techniques range from a few adjacent instructions
(so called peephole optimizations), over basic blocks, functions, set of functions,
up to the whole program.
Memory Barriers A memory barrier is a method of enforcing an ordering of
memory accesses by the CPU. It can be realized by a hardware-dependent barrier
instruction and is defined by the architecture’s memory ordering model and/or by a
compiler directive.
A memory barrier usually guarantees that memory operations are performed relative
to their position w.r.t. to the memory barrier, i.e., a access issued after the barrier
will also be executed after it, and vice versa.
Physical memory barriers, i.e., barrier instructions, are necessary in most modern
CPUs that employ out-of-order execution. Reordering of accesses that should go
unnoticed from the perspective of a single thread may lead to unexpected behavior
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when combined with the concurrent execution of other threads.
Memory barriers in the form of compiler directives are required in order to prevent
the compiler from reordering or removing accesses it deems redundant during
the compile process. A memory barrier should only be used if necessary, as it
is effectively handicapping the compiler in its optimization process. The most
common memory barrier directive is realized by the volatile keyword in C/C++.
The volatile keyword in C/C++ The intent of the volatile keyword was to
establish a way for C and C++ programs to directly access memory-mapped I/O.
Correct access to a hardware peripheral via memory-mapped I/O generally requires
that the order specified in the source code remains unchanged and none of the
I/O operations are omitted. A violation of equivalent ordering might break the
communication scheme the peripheral expects; omission, in conjunction with other
compiler optimization may lead to infinite loops or dead code. An example is
shown in Fig. 2.4. Without declaring status_register as volatile, the compiler might
either deduce that status_register is not changed in the body of the loop and only
check the condition once, or that the loop performs no meaningful action at all and
can be removed completely. In both cases the resulting machine code would not
implement the behavior intended by the source code.
1: int polling_read ( ) {
2: volatile * int data_register = DATA_ADR;
3: volatile * int status_register = STATUS_ADR;
4: while ( * status_register == 0) {
5: - - do nothing
6: };
7: return * data_register;
8: }
Figure 2.4: Polling read from a hardware peripheral. The CPU will stay in the
while-loop until the peripheral is ready.
Hence, a compliant compiler will create, for every access from or to a volatile
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variable by the abstract machine, an equivalent access from or to the memory
address corresponding to that variable in the concrete machine.
Note that volatile should not be used for inter-thread communication, as it does not
enforce cache consistency. As specified in the C standard [19], it should only be
used to represent memory-mapped I/O.
2.3.2 Hardware
Electronic hardware consists of one or more interconnected components performing
logic operations, often complemented by analog circuits, e.g., to provide a stable
power supply or drive an mechanical actuator. The term encompasses everything
from individual chips and circuits to distributed information processing systems.
This work is restricted in its scope to synchronous digital circuits, more specifically
those processing and interacting with low-level software. Furthermore, the terms
design and design process are used to reflect only the part of the overall fabrication
process that is concerned with specifying the logical behavior of the chip. For
actual fabrication, many subsequent steps, e.g., place-and-route or packaging, are
required.
Designing modern electronics is a highly complicated task, only manageable by
employing hierarchical architectures and relying on tool support for established
abstraction layers.
The layer with the least abstraction in which a digital circuit is generally represented
is called the transistor level. On this level, the detailed, non-linear electrical
behavior of a transistor is replaced with a simple switching behavior. The transistor
is either ’on’ or ’off’. The transistor level is the target layer for the design of
integrated circuits (ICs).
The next higher abstraction layer is the gate level. It uses logic gates that implement
common operators of Boolean logic, such as AND, OR and NOT. Hence, it is easy
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to establish a direct mapping between a formula in Boolean logic and a circuit on
the gate level, and the circuit can be optimized by applying boolean transformations.
The gate level is the target layer for designs intended to be instantiated on a Field
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), i.e., no synthesis to the transistor level is
required.
Both abstraction layers so far are significantly more abstract than the layer below
them. Yet, the abstraction is provided is not sufficient to handle modern designs.
The layers explained in the following – the Register Transfer Level (RTL) and the
Electronic System Level (ESL) – try to address this problem.
2.3.2.1 Register Transfer Level
The RTL serves as the current entry point of the design process, i.e., it is typical
practice to start a modern digital design at this level. It can be compared to what a
high-level language like C is to assembly.
It is important to note that a circuit is, in contrast to a software program, a hardwired
network of physical components. Hence, its functional behavior is based on
synchronous logic and well defined as a Finite State Machine (FSM) by three key
elements:
• registers, which refer to a set of bit vectors encoding the state information;
• registers transfers, which define transformations and movement of data
between registers in an imperative programming language, resulting in com-
binatorial logic;
• primary inputs, such as data and clocks which control and trigger the register
transfers, and primary outputs, whose value is determined by a function of
the registers and primary inputs.
The behavior of a design is defined by the flow of data between hardware registers.
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The special requirements of hardware design, especially the inherent concurrency
of hardware operations, led to the development of dedicated hardware description
languages (HDLs) like Verilog and VHDL. Analogous to the transformation of a
high-level source code to assembly by a compiler, high-level design descriptions
are transformed into gate level descriptions by the process of hardware synthesis.
However, these Hardware Desciption Languages (HDLs) did not start out with the
intention to serve as a design language, but were merely intended for modeling
and simulation. Even today, the result of this repurposing are language semantics
that are not particularly well suited for synthesis or formal verification, leading to
unnecessary complications for the respective tools and users. Nevertheless, until
today, VHDL and Verilog are still the standard languages for RTL design entry.
2.3.2.2 Electronic System Level
The challenges imposed by modern circuit design keep growing, up to the point
where even the abstraction provided by the RTL is not sufficient anymore to
compensate for the complexity of these challenges. The rate in which design
complexity increases outpaces our current efforts to increase design productivity.
A sensible solution to this might lie in further increasing the abstraction at which
designers operate when describing the design.
The ESL aims to enable that by establishing a new abstraction layer above the RTL.
One roadblock on that path is the lack of a common, universally agreed definition
what exactly constitutes the ESL. This is in stark contrast to the already existing
abstraction levels.
[22] provides the following informal definition:
"[The ESL is defined by the] utilization of appropriate abstractions
in order to increase comprehension about a system, and to enhance
the probability of a successful implementation of functionality in a
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cost-effective manner, while meeting necessary constraints."
While this definition conveys the intention of the ESL it is still too vague to serve
as a valid entry point of hardware design. It is up to the designer to define what
constitutes "appropriate abstraction" for his given task. This makes the development
of a universally applicable description language for ESL models complicated. As a
consequence, the actual semantics expressed by the various types of descriptions
at the ESL vary significantly depending on different design philosophies and
which aspect of the design is given emphasis — at higher levels of abstraction the
descriptions and design methods are, to a large degree, domain-specific.
A major factor impeding widespread application of the ESL for design and verifi-
cation is the semantic gap.
Semantic Gap A abstraction is sound w.r.t. something concrete if and only if a
well defined formal relationship between the abstraction and the concrete exists. A
new abstraction level can only then be used for design and verification when there
is a chain of sound abstractions from the new level all the way down to the physical
representation of the design. Otherwise, the semantics of the abstract model cannot
be understood in terms of the physical circuit. The benefit of establishing such a
sound abstraction level is that the verification result of one abstraction level can
be leveraged to establish confidence in a model of the same design at the next
higher abstraction level. Details verified for a circuit by analysis at an abstraction
level should therefore not have to be verified again at the higher abstraction level.
The transistor level is a sound abstraction of the physical level due to a defined
approximation of the electrical behavior of the transistor, and the gate level, in turn,
is sound to the transistor level via Boolean logic. Finally, a formal equivalence
check ensures the correctness of the RTL w.r.t. the gate level and thereby with the
transistor level.
However, the ESL has no such well defined relationship with the RTL, because it
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is, as mentioned before, not clearly defined itself. This breaks the chain of trust,
built through the other abstraction levels, which is the reason why verification of
RTL models can, with current methods, not be used to establish confidence in ESL
models, or vice versa.
This problem is well known and often referred to as the semantic gap between the
system level and the RT level. Note that the semantic gap does not simply result
from a lack of standardization of ESL descriptions, but rather is a theoretical prob-
lem of describing a sound relationship between RTL descriptions and profoundly
different descriptions which are neither cycle- nor bit-accurate.
Nevertheless, high-level descriptions at the ESL are of great value when the overall
functionality of larger systems should be specified and understood. Hence, ESL
models are widely adopted in the industry, but their use is currently restricted to
design elaboration and virtual prototyping.
A theoretical foundation attempting to bridge the semantic gap was proposed




In the following chapter, a formal approach for HW/SW-co-verification and the
involved models are presented. The goal of the proposed approach is to formally
verify that two software programs (e.g., an original program and an optimized
version) trigger the same behavior in a set of peripheral devices so that the I/O
behavior of the combined HW/SW system is identical for the two software versions.
The two program variants, by themselves, are not identical in their I/O behavior.
Due to the memory barriers in the code associated with the volatile keyword,
the optimizations are not performed by the compiler, but come as the result of a
manual effort or the use of a specialized optimization tool [43]. In the analysis, the
peripheral devices are assumed to be functionally independent of each other, i.e.,
there exist no hardware side effects of one device on another. This assumption is
usually fulfilled in practice.
The proposed approach intends to prove the equivalence of two program variants
accessing a peripheral device via a form of equivalence checking based on IPC (see
Sec. 2.1.3.2). As usual in equivalence checking, we do not show the correctness
of the program variants themselves. Hence, it is assumed that the original variant
is already deemed correct w.r.t. the intended functionality and can serve as the
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golden model on which the correctness of modifications can be evaluated. Such
modifications may comprise any change to internal computation as well as locally
restricted changes to accesses of the addressed peripheral, such as their reordering
and/or unification.
This chapter formalizes the details and definitions of the required models, followed
by experimental evaluation and discussion of the possible configurations.
3.1 Related Work
While there is a plethora of formal verification techniques that separately verify HW
or software, only relatively few works consider software at a hardware-dependent
level or even attempt a co-verification.
Many of of the approaches that do exist [24, 25], are rooted in and employ lan-
guages based on higher order logic. Besides the often substantial manual labor
required for the creation of the necessary formal models using such languages
requires advanced expertise that is often not available in standard design environ-
ments.
In [26] symbolic execution is employed to semi-automatically search for bugs in the
hardware/software interface. The method requires to derive a software abstraction
of the hardware from the actual implementation or the respective specification.
This necessitates further verification w.r.t. to the derived abstraction. [27] presents
a hardware/software co-verification tool for designs written in C/C++ and Verilog
RTL, along with a property specification framework. There, communication
between hardware and software is formalized using transactions to reduce the
number of possible interleavings. While certainly effective, these approaches
require formulating a set of properties to be matched against a specification. This
involves, again, substantial manual effort and requires the verification engineer to
have a deep understanding of the correct behavior of the co-design.
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In [12] an approach is presented to formally prove the equivalence of two low-
level hardware-dependent programs. This approach models the reactive behavior
of the software with the hardware and checks if two programs exhibit the same
access sequences at the hardware/software interface. However, the hardware
representation of the system is restricted to the executing processor core, i.e., the
peripheral itself is not taken into account. This disqualifies the approach for the
verification of modifications which change the I/O behavior of the software. As
motivated in the beginning of this work, this is an important class of optimizations
for tightly resource-constrained systems. Similarly, the software equivalence
checking approach of [28] as well as the hardware-dependent property checking
approaches of [25, 29, 30] consider only the software and are hence not suited to
verify this class of modifications, either.
One possible solution to address the limitations of HDLs is to establish the ESL
as a reliable design entry point. This requires to first bridge the semantic gap (see
2.3.2.2), a task attempted by Path Predicate Abstraction (PPA). The underlying
theory is presented in Sec. 3.5.2 and was first introduced in [31]. It is inspired by
the advances in theorem proving and the use of refinement maps [32, 33] to model
complex relationships between abstract and concrete models in hardware design
such as [34, 35, 36, 37, 38].
Notable success was obtained in the hardware domain by the notion of “bisimu-
lation modulo stuttering”, as demonstrated in [39] for hardware verification. The
difference between bisimulation modulo stuttering and PPA was already discussed
in [40].
It should be noted that other methods are loosely related to PPA and the related
methodologies. For example, in [41, 42] high-level simulation patterns or test
cases are used to derive properties for implementation verification. In contrast to
PPA and PPA-based flows, these approaches do not aim at establishing a formal
relationship between the system-level model and the RTL implementation, but
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instead to maintain coherence between the test cases at the different abstraction
levels.
As a consequence, verification results gained using such an ESL model are still
not directly transferable to the RTL implementation and therefore do not fulfill the
objectives of this thesis.
3.2 Verification Model
The overall verification task at hand is showing that a peripheral controlled by
a software variant A exhibits equivalent I/O behavior to a peripheral controlled
by a software variant B, assuming A and B are supposed to have equivalent
functionality.
A peripheral device communicates with the software through its register interface.
In addition, it has inputs and outputs to the environment for providing its service.
The notion of sequential hardware equivalence compares the inputs and outputs of
two digital circuits clock cycle by clock cycle. In most practical cases, this notion
is too strict for our problem. The overall I/O behavior of the HW/SW system may
vary regarding the timing at the clock cycle scale. If the inputs and outputs of the
peripheral device under the control of two versions of a software are functionally
equivalent but differ only in timing the common notion of HW/SW co-equivalence
modulo latency can be applied.
This notion of equivalence leads to prohibitively complex proof problems for
the types of systems considered here, when attempting the verification over the
full run time of the software. In many practical scenarios, however, the proof
problem can be decomposed into manageable subproblems As already elaborated
in the motivation of this thesis (see Sec. 1.2), the optimization of the firmware
usually changes the program behavior only locally. This is particularly true for the
optimizations that target the program memory footprint by increasing code reuse
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in the HW/SW interfaces of IoT platforms.
In our approach, we consider each peripheral device individually. We partition
both the original software and the revised software (with the optimizations) into
segments. The segmentation is chosen such that corresponding software segments
induce the same behavior in the peripheral device, i.e., corresponding segments are
expected to be functionally equivalent w.r.t. to this device.
Such a segmentation is possible if the optimizations are local and can be identified
and contained in a software segment. For example, a sequence of device configura-
tion steps may have been replaced by a different sequence after introducing a new
API function, however, without changing the effect on the device hardware. Such a
sequence would be placed in one segment.
The segmentation of the software allows to decouple individual activities of the
peripheral device temporally from each other, reducing the overall complexity of
the verification task.
The proposed verification model for one such decoupled activity is illustrated in
Fig. 3.1. It consists of three distinct sub-models:
• A software model approximating the behavior exhibited by a processor
executing the software under verification. Its purpose is to provide stimuli
and constraints to the hardware model.
• A hardware model representing the peripheral controlled by the software.
Not quite intuitively, the equivalence of software variants will be shown
on the hardware model. The specifics on how this is done depend on the
abstraction of the chosen hardware model.
• A model of the interconnect between the processor and the peripheral. It
translates the stimuli/constraints provided by the software model to a format
that can be processed by the respective hardware model.
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Figure 3.1: Unified HW/SW verification model
Each of these can be modeled on different levels of abstraction. For each compo-
nent, the chosen abstraction level affects the interactions with the other models and
depends on the specific goal of the verification task.
3.3 ACCESS Verification Method
The different variants for each sub-model (software, hardware, interconnect) may
use different notions of time. While the timing for each software segment might be
modeled with clock cycle accuracy, the time intervals between the segments are
modeled abstractly. Hence, our notion of equivalence is HW/SW co-equivalence
modulo latency, however, per software segment and under consideration of the
global software context. The exact equivalence condition is provided in the section
of the respective model.
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Once we have partitioned the software into segments we can build a computational
model and formulate an equivalence checking problem for this model.
ACCESS-local
𝑎, 𝑏 ↔ 𝑏, 𝑎
ACCESS-local















Figure 3.2: ACCESS-global : HW/SW miter. Localized proofs on the hardware
constraints by the I/O graph of the software model
Fig. 3.2 shows the overall computational model, which is constructed from several
ACCESS-local proofs, i.e., local unrollings over time of the unified HW/SW
verification model which try to prove only the equivalence of a part of the program.
ACCESS-local proofs, amongst other things, will be presented in more detail below.
In the figure, the software models of the original and the modified firmware are
each represented by an I/O graph (G1 and G2, respectively).
Each vertex in G1 and G2 represents an I/O access of the software to an examined
peripheral P . Any edge (v, u) in one of the graphs indicates that there exists at
least one path from v to u in the software. In case that software contains multiple
paths leading from v to u, all of them are represented by a single edge in the I/O
graph. The actual sequence of possible transactions represented by this edge is
still contained in the software model, but not shown/relevant for the concept of
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(b) I/O graph G′
Figure 3.3: A graph representing a software’s execution and corresponding I/O
graph. Gray nodes represent Load/Store accesses to the peripheral P .
ACCESS-global . A simple example of this is illustrated in Fig. 3.3.
Formally an I/O graph is defined as follows:
Definition 2 (I/O graph). Assume a graph G = (V,E), a peripheral P and an
addressing function α. A vertex v ∈ V is a load/store to P iff α(v, P ) = 1. A
graph G′ = (V ′, E ′) is called I/O graph of G to P iff (∀v ∈ V ′ ⊆ V : α(v, P ) =
1) ∧ (∀(v, u) ∈ E ′ : ∃{(v, v1), (v1, v2), ..., (vn−1, u)} ⊆ E)
The hardware model of the peripheral is unrolled for a given set of I/O accesses
specified by the I/O graph until all accesses in the set are modeled and either the
equivalence condition of the hardware model or an upper limit of additional cycles
has been reached.
As mentioned in Sec. 3.2, trying to capture the whole behavior of the software
in a single, monolithic proof instance quickly results in an infeasible model that
cannot be solved in an acceptable time, if at all. To mitigate this escalating proof
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complexity, this work proposes partitioning the overall proof into a number of
smaller proof instances, each showing the equivalence of a subset of accesses.
We assume that the peripheral device and its respective hardware models are
deterministic. Hence, it is not necessary to wait until the complete reaction of
the peripheral to a series of accesses is resolved in order to determine whether
two access sequences are equivalent. Instead, it is sufficient to show that both
sequences induce an equivalent state in the peripheral. This assumes that the
peripherals operate under equivalent basic conditions, e.g., identical incoming
transmissions/requests from the environment. The setup verifying this for a given
sequence is called ACCESS-local.
ACCESS-local contains two instances of the peripheral (as in a classical equiva-
lence checking miter) whose outputs are compared. Each instance of the peripheral
is controlled by device accesses from the respective I/O graph. The software
models behind both I/O graphs G1 and G2 are both connected to the same primary
inputs, i.e., they model the original and the revised firmware under the same initial
memory content and under the same inputs received from other sources (OS, I/O).
For the sake of clearer representation and focus, this constraint is not shown in
Fig. 3.2. Both I/O graphs are partitioned and the partitions mapped in a way
that assumes that the mapped access sequences are equivalent. For every such
pair an ACCESS-local module is created. For each ACCESS-local module, an
equivalence check is carried out comparing the two instances of the peripheral
under the influence of the original and revised firmware, respectively. For the
example in Fig. 3.2, the computational model is constructed for three equivalence
checks, each comparing a pair of software segments with regard to the peripheral
behavior. The first one checks whether the access sequence (a, b) in G1 generates
the same behavior in the peripheral as the access sequence (b, a) in G2. The second
check evaluates whether sequence (c, d, e) in G1 produces the same effects in the
peripheral as sequence (e, g) in G2. The last check seems trivial: it compares
the instruction sequence (f) in G1 with (f) in G2. Even though the accesses (f)
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Unrolled Unified Model for 𝑮𝟏
Unrolled Unified Model for 𝑮𝟐
𝐺1
Figure 3.4: ACCESS-local: device miter.
themselves may be identical, the values written depend on the computations of the
software model represented by the I/O graph and may be different.
Any difference will be detected because the computational model for an ACCESS-
local check includes the full prior execution history (or an over-approximation of
it), not just the compared segments, even though only the accesses from a segment
are connected to an ACCESS-local module.
Fig. 3.4 illustrates the internals of an ACCESS-local module. Two instances of the
peripheral are unrolled for a finite number of time frames. The unrolling begins
at an arbitrary state which is, however, identical for both instances. Each instance
is controlled by an access sequence from the respective software: one from the
original, here called G1, the other one from the modified variant, here called G2,
as illustrated in the figure. The minimum number of time frames needed depends
largely on the length of the examined sequences, but is also influenced by the
chosen abstraction level of the hardware model. The maximum number of cycles
is determined by a set of user-specified parameters. The outputs of the peripheral
device as well as the ending state reached at the end of the time frame expansion
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are compared for equality.
What does this equivalence check verify? It checks that the behavior of the
peripheral device observable from outside of the HW/SW system is the same
for both, the segment of the original and the segment of the revised software,
modulo timing variations. The proof is conservative because it considers the device
behavior from an arbitrary starting state, i.e., the proof includes the state which the
device is in when the respective software segment begins execution.
Theorem 1. If all ACCESS-local equivalence checks (one for each pair of mapped
software segments) are successful then the peripheral device behavior is the same
for the golden and the revised firmware as a whole.
Proof. By induction.
Step: ACCESS-local proves the following: If a peripheral device starts from
the same state at the beginning of the revised software segment as it does at the
beginning of the original software segment, then, after either segment, it arrives in
the same ending state.
Base: The peripheral device is in the same state (the reset state) at the beginning of
the first segment of either software.
Unfortunately, a completely arbitrary starting state may result in false negatives
because one (or both) of the software variants may operate under the (correct)
assumption that the peripheral was previously configured in a certain way. The
equivalence of two access sequences may hinge on such an assumption. As a result,
it might be necessary to propagate certain information from one local proof to
another. Only registers whose values may only change by request of the software
are eligible for this. Independent of their function in the peripheral, we refer to
these further on as configuration registers.
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An initial dependency graph of this flow of information can be easily extracted
from the I/O graphs of the software. In Fig. 3.2, possible information dependen-
cies between instances of ACCESS-local are indicated by a dashed arrows. The
emerging information dependency graph imposes an order in which the respective
ACCESS-local instances should be processed. Potentially, this can impede the
application of parallel computation in the overall verification task, which in turn
can be mitigated by reducing the depth of the information dependency graph.
For most peripherals and their respective software drivers, only a minority of
accesses target configuration registers. Most likely, these are clustered at the
beginning of the program’s execution. In the initial dependency graph which
is structurally derived from the program, this information is propagated via the
transitive property of configuration registers: If a configuration register’s value
was not changed by the access sequence of a proof instance, the value remains
the same for successor proofs in the dependency graph. By backtracking such a
path of transitive constraints to proof instances whose access sequence targets a
configuration register we can replace the path by a single edge in the dependency
graph. Fig. 3.5a conceptually shows a structurally derived dependency graph and
Fig. 3.5b the corresponding reduced graph. In the example provided by the figure,
in the initial graph the only parallel executable proof instances are B and C. After
removing unnecessary constraints, D and E can start computing as soon as the
result for C is available.
3.4 Software Model
The software is modeled either on the binary level or on the source code level. The
binary model is created by extracting a CFG from the binary of the program and
creating a PN (see Sec. 2.1.4). To use a source code model in the unified verification
model, the modeled program needs to be written in C/C++. Furthermore, the











(b) Reduced dependency graph
Figure 3.5: Flattening of the information dependency graph to enable parallel
computation of proof instances.
wrapper.
The following definitions are of importance for the verification method, indepen-
dent of the chosen level of abstraction:
Definition 3 (Value). A value is the precise meaning of the contents of an object
when interpreted as having a specific type [19].
For example, a 32-bit object 0x00000001 interpreted as an integer has the value 1.
The same object interpreted as bool yields the value true.
Definition 4 (Expression). An expression is a sequence of operators and operands
that specifies computation of a value, or that designates an object or a function, or
that generates side effects, or that performs a combination thereof [19].
Definition 5 (Statement). A statement is a syntactic unit of an imperative pro-
gramming language L expressing some action to be carried out. A statement may
contain internal components, such as expressions or other statements.
Definition 6 (Program). A program PL(S,E) is a collection of one or more
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statements s ∈ S of language L and (s1, s2) ∈ E ⇐⇒ s2 is a syntactically valid
successor of s1 in L.
Definition 7 (Code Segment). A code segment is a subset W ⊆ S of statements,
W = {s0, s1, . . . , sn}, lying on a path from the beginning statement, s0, to the end
statement, sn, i.e., it is (si, si+1) ∈ E for 0 ≤ i < n.
Definition 8 (Access Sequence). An access sequence α of a code segment W is a
sequence of accesses (z1, z2, . . .) to the peripheral device registers, corresponding
to load/store instructions in W . Each access zi has a type (“read” or “write”),
and an address representing a device register.
Definition 9 (Access Cover). A set, C = {α1, α2, . . . , αm}, of access sequences
in a program P (S,E) such that
⋃m
i=1 αi contains every access in P , is called a
cover of P .
For equivalence checking, we model both, the original firmware P1 and the revised
firmware P2, by a decomposition of the same number m of access sequences such
that we obtain a access cover C1 for P1 and a cover C2 for P2. The decomposition
is chosen such that there is a one-to-one mapping between the elements of C1
and C2.
Definition 10 (Sequence Mapping). Given two code covers, C1 and C2, with
|C1| = |C2| = m, a bijection M : C1 7→ C2 is called sequence mapping.
For every access sequence α1,i of the original program there is a corresponding
access sequence α2,i of the revised program. The sequences and a mapping M are
defined such that corresponding sequences of the original and the revised software
are expected to induce the same behavior of the peripheral device.
Sequence mapping according to Def. 10 is mainly a manual task, and is usually




Accesses generated by load/store instructions in the software produce read/write
transactions at the peripheral device registers. The translation of an access sequence
to a format that can be correctly processed by the respective hardware model (see
Sec. 3.5) is handled by the interconnect (see Sec. 3.6).
3.4.1 Binary Level – Program Netlist
At the binary level we use PNs as described in Sec. 2.1.4 to model the behavior
of the software and possible interactions with the targeted device registers of the
hardware model. A PN represents all execution paths between an entry and an exit
point in the software. It models the software behavior at the ISA level, including
load/store accesses to the peripheral device registers.
A PN is a combinational circuit representing the execution of a sequential circuit,
i.e., a processor executing a program, over time. In its base form, it does not
consider the time required for performing an execution step, but operates on
logical time, i.e., it only captures the ordering of events, without any established
relationship to the physical duration between these events. The order of execution
is implicitly modeled by the placement of a node (i.e., instruction) in the EXG.
If required, the PN can be extended to be cycle-accurate with further analysis, as
presented in Chap. 5.
The concept represents software inherently as hardware in a language of choice
(VHDL, Verilog, etc.). Hence, integrating it with the hardware model is straightfor-
ward.
Due to the unrolling of the CFG into an EXG, each segment is completely contex-
tualized, e.g., the exact iteration of unrolling is known. The low level of abstraction
w.r.t. the actual execution of a program running on a processor allows to catch




Only this low level of abstraction enables the analysis of post-compiler optimiza-
tions. As a drawback, the size of the analyzed program is limited by the ability to
create the respective PN.
As mentioned earlier, a key element of our approach is to partition the overall
verification task into smaller, manageable subtasks. Although the program netlist
represents all possible executions of the software from entry to exit, we do not
consider all accesses to the peripheral along full execution paths. Instead, we
decompose the sequence of accesses along an execution path into segments that
are considered individually. This is possible due to the local nature of firmware
optimizations applied in industrial practice during platform customization and
ensures the scalability of the approach.
3.4.2 Source Code Level – C/C++
The proposed approaches utilize proof techniques and tools initially developed
solely for the purpose of verifying hardware. Hence, integrating the software of a
mixed HW/SW system requires a way to model the software in some compatible
manner.
True to its name, the software model at the source code level does this before any
compilation, i.e., translation into machine instructions, is performed. This is why
the source code model is not able to take the specifics of the ISA of the target
platform into account. It is an ISA-agnostic, pure representation of the software
behavior as specified by the abstract machine (see Sec. 2.3.1.2).
As a consequence, proofs based on the source code model are unable to capture
bugs caused by interactions specific to instructions (or instruction sequences)
of a given ISA. Furthermore, the model is unable to represent certain types of
optimization, such as peephole optimization.
These are typical shortcomings of a model of a higher level of abstraction; after
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all, some details must be dropped in order to have significant abstraction. On the
other hand it naturally has the usual advantages of a model of higher abstraction,
namely:
• Better knowledge/understanding of the overall control and data flow. It is
much easier to extract a complete CFG at the source code level based on
function calls and returns than it is at the binary level where the target address
of an indirect jump must be computed.
• Operating on variables instead of bit vectors.
• Independence of the restricted capabilities of the hardware platform. Some
arithmetic computations are more complex and/or more expensive to imple-
ment in hardware than others. Most notable are multiplication and division.
If the platform lacks a dedicated functional unit to perform these operations
the same result must be achieved by replacing the operation with an equiv-
alent sequence of other computations. For example, multiplication can be
replaced by repeated shifting and addition. Division is implemented as either
fast (e.g., Goldschmidt division) or slow division (e.g., SRT division), which
replace the division with series of multiplications or subtractions, respec-
tively. Hence, multiplications and divisions will produce complex behavior
at at the binary level. This significantly increases the effort required by a
proof engine when handling this model.
If the trade-off between lost specificity w.r.t. the software behavior and the compu-
tational load on the proof engine is justifiable (or necessary) depends on the nature
of the targeted application.
In the scope of this thesis only source code in the language of C/C++ (with some
restrictions regarding allowed language features) is considered. This is due to
practical reasons, not due to some theoretical limitation. Any high-level language
meeting the necessary requirements could be used to provide a source code model,
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given proper tool support. Given the predominance of the C language for im-
plementing low-level software directly interacting with hardware, e.g., drivers,
we see no immediate need to extend the practical aspects of this chapter to other
languages.
To integrate source code of a driver into the unified model a hardware representation
implementing the behavior of the drivers abstract machine is derived. For this task
the source code of the driver is embedded in a wrapper module written in SystemC.
This allows to contextualize the software’s source code as hardware with the help
of commercial tools, e.g., Onespin 360 DV-Verify™ [8].
In the unified model, due to the abstraction of the interconnect between the software
and hardware sub-models, there is no need for the two to use the same notion
of time. By being ISA-agnostic, the source code model will hardly provide a
cycle-accurate timing. When synthesizing the computational model of the target
software, its behavior is defined by a set operation in between synchronization
points. The synchronization points correspond to accesses of memory mapped
I/O by the software. The operations are derived from the possible execution
paths between synchronization points. In the model they could be represented by
synthesizing them to combinational circuits, transformed into Boolean formulas
or other representations of a function, depending on the internal workings of the
utilized tool. In any case, all execution paths need to be of finite length.
3.5 Hardware Model
In the scope of this thesis the model of the hardware is either represented by an
RTL or a SystemC-PPA ESL description.
Definition 11 (Access Pattern). An access pattern is a sequence of sets of logic




An access pattern is the RTL view of an access sequence of Def. 8, which is the
programmer’s view of the communication with the device. At the RTL, an access
pattern is a clock cycle-accurate “waveform” of read and write transactions at
the register interface. At the ESL, it is a series of messages. The individual RTL
transactions or ESL messages may vary in timing and may be separated by “idle”
periods, i.e., clock cycles of inactivity at the register interface.
A single access sequence therefore corresponds to a multitude of possible access
patterns.
3.5.1 Register Transfer Level
The general concept of a hardware RTL has already been presented in Sec. 2.3.2.1.
Hence, only those aspects immediately relevant for understanding the proposed
verification approach or those playing a major role in distinguishing it from an ESL
model are elaborated in this section.
The RTL model is a clock cycle accurate representation of the final hardware circuit.
This often results in complex implementations which provide not only the logic
necessary for implementing the desired functionality, but also include (intended)
logic redundancy, safety mechanisms and considerations for physical problems
(e.g., oversampling inputs to mitigate noise on an unstable communication line,
using multiple synchronization registers per data bit to avoid metastability).
As a result, the RTL model has a comparatively large state space and/or sequential
depth. Together they pose a significant load for the proof engine which quickly
becomes prohibitive when trying to verify the effects of an input sequence. For
example, a single write access to a Universal Asynchronous Receive Transmitter
(UART) peripheral by the CPU can trigger the transmission of data that can last
hundreds or thousands of clock cycles.
Hence, in order to include a hardware model at the RTL and still have a feasible
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unified model we need to reduce the number of cycles necessary to unroll.
Fortunately, hardware peripherals are deterministic. Hence, assuming equivalent
input sequences from the environment, two instances of the peripheral will exhibit
equivalent behavior as soon as they are in equivalent states (and will be in the
future). This enables us to limit the proof to the time window from the start of one
sequence up to the point in time such an equivalent state or a predefined number of
cycles is reached. This leads directly to the second point:
A premise of the presented verification approach is the assumption that the op-
timizations and modifications to the HW/SW system are rooted in the access
behavior of the software to the peripheral. The hardware model of the peripheral
in each instance of the combined HW/SW system remains largely unchanged. Dif-
ferences between the instances come only from changes to the addressing scheme,
regrouping of registers that allows for a direct one-to-one mapping and removal of
functionally redundant registers.
Definition 12 (Register Set). AssumeRΦ is the set of all registers in a peripheral Φ.
R ⊆ RΦ is called a register set.
The following analogy tries to convey the basic idea behind partitioning the set
of registers of a design into several register sets: Imagine the RTL design as
mechanical contraption. The register sets form the gears, pulleys and levers inside
the apparatus. The value of a register set represents the position of a lever or how
much a gear is rotated from its base position. To determine whether two such
contraptions will perform the same operations in the future we need to verify that
the levers controlling the behavior are in the same position. For the gears, however,
it is often irrelevant how much they are set off from the base position, as long as
we can show that the gears turn in the right direction.
Definition 13 (Register Value). Consider a register r and a timepoint t. The value
of r at t is defined as r(t) : r → {0, 1}|r|. Given a register set R = {r0, r1, ..., rn}
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the value of the set is defined as the set of respective assignments R(t) : R →
{r0(t), r1(t), ..., rn, (t)}
Def. 13 serves mainly to introduce a notation to differentiate between the value of
a register and the register itself, as well as to emphasize its variability over time.
Definition 14 (Register Mapping). A bijection M : R 7→ R̂ between two register
sets R and R̂ is called a register mapping.
A register mapping ensures that every register in a given set has a mapped coun-
terpart in the corresponding set of the modified system. Usually, finding such a
mapping is trivial: The registers of the peripheral models should not have changed
and can be mapped solely based on their name.
Definition 15 (Peripheral Cover). A set C = {R1, R2, ..., Rm} of register sets of a
peripheral Φ such that
⋃m
i=1Ri = RΦ, is called a cover of Φ.
A peripheral cover ensures that every register of a peripheral is grouped in a register
set.
Definition 16 (Peripheral Mapping). A bijection M : C 7→ Ĉ between two
peripheral covers C and Ĉ is called a peripheral mapping, if for each register set
in the covers a register map exists.
A peripheral mapping ensures that every register of a peripheral is actually part of
a register mapping.
Definition 17 (Equivalent System State). Assume a peripheral mapping M :
C 7→ Ĉ, with C = {R1, R2, ..., Rm}, Ĉ = {R̂1, R̂2, ..., R̂m}. Furthermore, let
I = [t, tmax] be an interval of timepoints. An equivalent system state Σ is reached
if ∀(R, R̂) ∈M : ∃(τ, τ̂) ∈ I × I : R(τ) = R̂(τ̂) .
An equivalent system state of a peripheral mapping is reached if for each of its
register mappings a pair of timepoints (τ, τ̂) exists such that both register sets have
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the same value in a given interval [t, tmax].
Grace Period. The ACCESS-local approach verifies whether two different access
sequences can drive a peripheral device into the same ending state, modulo differ-
ences in timing. The computational model must accommodate for a number of
clock cycles of hardware action in the device after the last access in a sequence has
occurred, before the ending state has been reached. We call this the “grace period”
of the equivalence check.
The trivial solution for finding a peripheral mapping is having only a single register
mapping that contains every register of the design. In the context of the analogy,
this would mean that our mechanical machine would contain only a single large
gear wheel. For many designs this is a feasible choice. For others, especially those
with a lot of internal counters, it can result in an extreme delay of cause and effect
in the hardware, beyond the acceptable range for unrolling.
Hence, the first refinement of the peripheral mapping of such a peripheral is to
identify counters and place them in their own register map.
A further refinement is to make a distinction between volatile and configuration
registers. In the context of this thesis, a configuration register is a register of a
peripheral that can only be changed by a write access from the CPU / the system
bus. Every other register, i.e., registers which can change their value due to events
in the environment or internal processes are called volatile registers (based on the
similar concept in software).
3.5.1.1 Device Check
If an ACCESS-local check is successful the compared software segments are
guaranteed to be equivalent, within the global SW context, w.r.t. device behavior. If
a firmware optimization is not correct then the ACCESS-local check is guaranteed
to fail for the corresponding segments.
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However, the opposite is not true, i.e., if an ACCESS-local check fails this doesn’t
necessarily mean that the compared SW segments are not equivalent. The reason
for this lies in the division of the overall verification problem into manageable
subproblems. In order for Theorem 1 to be applicable, the ACCESS-local construct
must be conservative by analyzing the behavior of the peripheral from an arbitrary
starting state. This may lead to spurious counterexamples if the starting state of the
counterexample is not reachable in the combined HW/SW system.
For example, consider a communication peripheral that needs to be configured and
then can be used to transmit data. Normal usage performs these steps separately
and it may, in fact, be a requirement that no configuration happens when the
device is busy. Let’s formulate this requirement as a constraint in the form of an
implication busy =⇒ ¬config. Assume now that we are running an ACCESS-
local equivalence check to compare two SW segments that configure the peripheral.
Since the ACCESS-local computational model begins at an arbitrary state it may
return a counterexample in which the constraint is violated, i.e., in which the device
begins at a busy state and receives a config command. This counterexample is,
most likely, spurious because the device cannot be in a busy state when the SW is
still in the device configuration phase. In view of the whole HW/SW system the
starting state of the counterexample is unreachable.
When an ACCESS-local check fails, the verification engineer would need to
manually analyze the counterexample. If the counterexample is spurious because a
constraint was violated, the property instance needs to be strengthened by adding
a constraint (in fact, an invariant of the HW/SW system). In our example, the
implication busy =⇒ ¬config would be added.
Usually, a peripheral device imposes several constraints like this on the software
using it. Such constraints are a consequence of the device’s inner architecture,
and, often enough, not all of these constraints are documented for the software
programmer. Discovering undocumented constraints through debugging ACCESS-
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local checks may be tedious but also very valuable, because the counterexample
can also result from plain firmware inequivalence or from an actual bug in the
device hardware.
We can use the basic idea of the ACCESS-local approach to specifically search
for undocumented device preconditions as well as for bugs. We construct an
ACCESS-local model as in Fig. 3.4 but do not connect it to any program netlists.
Instead, we control both instances of the device hardware by an access sequence
that is arbitrary but the same for both instances. For each instance, the ACCESS-
local construct models all access patterns (of a given fixed length), i.e., all valid
waveforms in all timing variations that represent the abstract access sequence. The
problem formulation searches for a pair of access patterns that induce a different
ending state in the device. If a solution exists then we have found an access
sequence for which the device behavior depends on the actual access timing. Such
an access sequence either violates a constraint unknown so far or it exposes a bug
in the device hardware.
We call this check the ACCESS Device Check. Every constraint found in this check
is iteratively added to a constraint set. This set is used to exclude the same spurious
counterexamples to be returned again in further runs of the Device Check. The
complete constraint set is then used in the ACCESS-local equivalence checks with
the effect that all spurious counterexamples are prevented.
3.5.2 Electronic System Level – SystemC-PPA
The computation effort required in the proposed verification approach largely
depends on two factors: the complexity of the hardware peripheral (in terms of
sequential depth and size of its state space) and the length of a software’s access
sequences. If the complexity of the peripheral cannot be mitigated by the techniques
presented in Sec. 3.5.1 or the sequence mapping (see Def. 10) contains one or more
very long access sequence, this can become an issue. In such a case, using the
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peripheral’s RTL description as the hardware model will most probably result in
proofs that are too complex to be solved in an acceptable amount of time, if at all.
A more abstract model at the ESL might provide a solution for this issue. In
order for this to have any value, the verification results must be transferable. This
requires a formal connection between the respective models at the ESL and the
RTL, i.e., the abstraction must be formally sound. The basis for establishing such a
connection is laid out in Sec. 3.5.3 where the notion of Path Predicate Abstraction
is reviewed.
Deriving an PPA from a RTL description costs non-negligible overhead. Hence, it
should only be considered if the expected increase in proof performance justifies
the cost or if it will not solely be used for the purpose of this verification approach,
such as applications as virtual protoype or in unrelated ESL verification approaches.
On the other hand, when following a top-down design approach, similar to the one
suggested in [44], the required ESL model is already available at no additional cost.
Note, that this does not mean it is always the superior choice. Naturally, using the
ESL model restricts proofs to effects and details which are actually modeled by it.
Hence, the ESL model must be created with its future use case already in mind.
Otherwise, it might lack information that is crucial for a particular application.
The different representation of the peripheral in the hardware model requires a
different definition of what constitutes equivalence.
Definition 18 (Equivalence at the ESL). Let ΦP(σ) = {φ0, φ1, ..., φm} describe
the sequence of operations performed by a peripheral P under the sequence of
I/O accesses σ = {σ0, σ1, ..., σn}. Further, let ΩP(σ) = {ω0, ω1, ..., ωk} describe
the sequence of messages sent by P to its environment. Two combined hardware/-
software systems (P, S) and (P,S) are considered equivalent iff ΦP (S) = ΦP(S)
and ΩP (S) = ΩP(S).
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In simple terms, two systems are equivalent if and only if the access sequences
of the software models result in the identical sequence of operations and sent
messages in the respective SystemC-PPA model.
3.5.3 Path Predicate Abstraction
The theoretical foundation of the PPA has been published in [40, 45, 46]. It
provides a novel take on extending the chain of trust, which winds itself trough the
various hardware abstraction levels – currently starting from the transistor level,
through the gate level, and ending at the RTL – to also include the ESL.
In the current chain of trust, the correctness of an abstraction w.r.t. to the model it
was abstracted from, can be verified by formal equivalence checking techniques
such as combinational or sequential equivalence checking. The theoretical applica-
bility of such techniques hinges on finding a suitable and verifiable definition or no-
tion of equivalence. Two combinational circuits are equivalent if they produce, for
the same input vector x, the output vector y, i.e., both implement the same Boolean
function f(x) = y. For sequential circuits, equivalency changes in that it is now
defined on sequences. For identical same input sequences X = {x0, x1, ..., xn} the
circuit must produce the identical output sequence Y = {y0, y1, ..., yn}, i.e., the
same functional behavior of the circuits is captured by the same FSM.
Unfortunately, defining such a notion of equivalence between models at the ESL
and the RTL proved to be rather difficult. Due to the semantic gap (see Sec. 2.3.2.2)
between these two abstraction levels it is not clearly defined how the inputs and
outputs of the RTL will be represented in the ESL. In contrast to the RTL, there is
no notion of time, in terms of clock ticks, at the ESL. The transfer of data between
two hardware modules via a common bus might be modeled as passing a message
from the sender to the recipient based on events. The same transfer, at the RTL,
can become an arbitrarily complex, cycle-accurate bus protocol. So how can these
two be mapped to each other such that it can be shown that the ESL model is a
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sound abstraction of the RTL model?
In the following, only the basic ideas necessary for understanding the principles
behind the creation of a PPA are presented. For an in-detail explanation of its
formal development, please refer to [40].
A necessary core concept is formed by a special graph labeling or coloring called
“operational coloring”.
Definition 19 (Operational Graph Coloring). Consider a directed graph G =
(V,E), a subset W ⊆ V of the graph nodes called colored nodes, a set of col-
ors Ŵ = {ŵ1, ŵ2, . . .} and a surjective coloring function c : W 7→ Ŵ .
A path (v0, v1, . . . , vn) such that v0, vn ∈ W and v1, . . . , vn−1 ∈ V \W is called
an operational path in G. The set W must be chosen and colored such that:
• every cyclic path in G contains at least one node from W , i.e., the graph
contains no cycles with only uncolored nodes,
• for every operational path (v0, v1, . . . , vn) and u0 ∈ W , such that c(u0) =
c(v0), there must exist an operational path (u0, u1, . . . , um) in G with
c(um) = c(vn)
We call c an operational coloring function and G an operationally colored graph.
Fig. 3.6a shows a directed graph abstractly representing a finite state transition
diagram, e.g., a Kripke model or an FSM. After inspecting the graph it should be
visible that the given example satisfies the requirements above and is indeed an
operationally colored graph:
• Its nodes are either colored in blue, green and yellow (v ∈ W with Ŵ =












(b) Path Predicate Abstraction
Figure 3.6: Operational Graph Coloring and resulting Path Predicate Abstraction
• The graph contains no path starting from an uncolored node vx, ..., vx, that
does not contain at least one colored node.
• If there is a path from one colored node to another colored node, this is true
for every node of the respective colors.
Definition 20 (Path Predicate Abstraction). We consider a graph G = (V,E) with
a set of colored nodes W ⊆ V , a set of colors Ŵ and an operational coloring
function c : W 7→ Ŵ .
A directed graph Ĝ = (Ŵ , Ê), such that for any two nodes u,w ∈ W , it is
(c(u), c(w)) ∈ Ê if and only if there is an operational path (u, . . . , w) in G, is
called path predicate abstraction of G.
As a result, an abstracted graph contains exactly one node for each color in the
color set Ŵ . Path segments through uncolored nodes in the original graph are
replaced by single edges in the abstract graph. Assuming that colored nodes are
rare in comparison to uncolored ones, this will yield a dramatic reduction in the
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number of nodes, corresponding with an equally powerful abstraction.
Since all nodes of identical color provide transitions to the same set of reachable
colors, we can replace the original graph by an abstract graph that has one node for
each color and one edge representing each such transition. In the process, white
nodes are removed and all operational paths of the same kind are collapsed into a
single edge. Fig. 3.6b shows the corresponding abstract graph to the operationally
colored graph of Fig. 3.6a.
Both graphs contain the same set of operations: b→ g, g → b, g → y, y → b.
This provides the key to creating a suitable mapping as required in defining a notion
of equivalence. The definitions above create a well-defined formal relationship
between the abstract graph and the original graph: Any path in the abstract graph
can be described by a sequence of colors. The hypothetical bus transaction men-
tioned earlier is represented by such an operation. The intricacies of a complex bus
protocol at the RTL are modeled by uncolored nodes.
3.6 Interconnect Models
The interconnect model is an abstraction of the actual communication structure
between the CPU executing the firmware and the targeted peripheral on the chip.
Its main task is to translate the I/O requests generated by the firmware on the CPU
into a format that can be processed by the hardware model. Depending on the
models for soft- and hardware this can be as easy as passing a message from one
model to the other, or demand mimicking the full behavior of bus protocol with
correct timing.
In the simple case of both models being able to use message passing, i.e., both
being implemented in a variation of SystemC, the interconnect can be as simple
as a SystemC channel. In the more complicated combinations, the interconnect
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model is realized using assumptions and constraints on the respective interfaces of
the hardware and software model. These are implemented using common property
specification languages such as ITL and System Verilog Assertions (SVA).
The decision to model the interconnect using constraints instead of a hardware
structure has two reasons: First, the model of the hardware is unrolled for the
minimal amount of time necessary to prove or disprove equivalence of a single
access sequence. Yet, a program consists of many access sequences that need to be
verified. Second, if the software is modeled as a PN, the (logical) time of an I/O
access is not modeled by unrolling the circuit, but by the placement of the access
within the PN.
This either requires many small interconnect models, each forming a single local-
ized proof, resulting in an extensive overhead of re-elaborating and re-compiling
the resulting verification model, or a prohibitively large multiplexer structure to
handle correct connection.
Furthermore, the PN (see Sec. 3.4) is a combinational representation of a sequential
circuit unrolled over time. Integrating an instance of a PN as the software model in
the unified verification model will result in the repeated unrolling of this already
unrolled representation. Using constraints over actual hardware for implementing
the interconnect allows us to connect the unrolled hardware model with the software
model at a single point of time. As a result, the proof does not rely on the subsequent
unrollings of the software model, which in turn, significantly reduces the size of the
model (see Tab. 4.2 in Sec. 4.1.1). The concept is visualized in Fig. 3.7. It shows
the unrolling of a hardware device (HW) over three time steps. In the unrolled
integration scheme Fig. 3.7a each timestep contains its own instance of the program
netlist. In the static integration scheme shown in 3.7b only a single instance of the
program netlist is created. All other steps connect back to this instance.
Two types of interconnect models are presented in the following: Protocol Emula-

















Figure 3.7: Model with redundantly unrolled PN and static PN
3.6.1 Protocol Emulation
As it name suggests, an interconnect model based on protocol emulation tries to
generate behavior as it is generated by a bus system connected to the peripheral’s
interface. This type of interconnect is especially suited for widely used protocols,
such as the ARM Advanced Microcontroller Bus Architecture (AMBA) [47].
The AMBA bus protocols are a set of interconnect specifications from ARM
that standardize on-chip communication mechanisms between various functional
blocks. A System on Chip (SoC) built with AMBA typically has one or more
processors along with several other components, e.g., internal memory and various
peripherals like USB, UART, PCIE, I2C etc.
From the various AMBA protocols, the Advanced Peripheral Bus (APB) is of
special interest to us, as it is used for connecting low-bandwidth peripherals. It is
a simple non-pipelined protocol that can be used to communicate (read or write)
from a bridge/master to a number of slaves through the shared bus. The reads and
writes share the same set of signals. Fig. 3.8a and Fig. 3.8b show the waveform of
these signals as required by a single write or read transfer, respectively.
In the AMBA hierarchy, APB is not designed to directly handle communication
requests from a CPU but to serve as a secondary bus to a more complex proto-
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(a) write transfer (b) read transfer
Figure 3.8: ARM AMBA APB with wait states [47]
col, such as Advanced eXtensible Interface Bus (AXI), which is useful for high
bandwidth and low latency interconnects.
Including the necessary hardware into the verification model would unnecessarily
increase the load on the proof engine. In order to avoid this, protocol emulation
enforces the correct behavior of the interface signals by a set (or suite) of constraints
specific to the protocol, essentially cutting out most of the hardware involved in
the SoC’s bus system.
Due to it’s role as a secondary bus, peripherals implementing an APB interface
are only capable of word-size communication. It is expected that half-word or
byte-sized accesses are translated to word-size by the AXI/APB bridge.
Because the constraint suite can only enforce behavior which the hardware is
inherently capable of, a small hardware attachment in front of the peripherals
interface must be added. As its task is only to translate various accesses to word
size it is significantly less complex than the actual AXI/APB bridge.
The constraint suite shown in Fig. 3.9, together with the API macro suite in
Fig. 3.10 and the aforementioned hardware attachment, form a minimal viable
framework to model an APB interconnect model.
The constraints were manually derived from the APB specification document.Due
to the relative simplicity of each individual constraint, automated generation tech-
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1: macro expr implies(expr condition, consequence) :=
2: ! condition || consequence;
3: end macro;
4:
5: constraint reset_enable_when_ready :=
6: implies(PENABLE && PREADY, next(! PENABLE));
7: end constraint;
8:




13: constraint stable_read_or_write_mode :=
14: implies(PENABLE , PWRITE = prev(PWRITE));
15: end constraint;
16:
17: constraint stable_data_during_write :=
18: implies(PENABLE && PWRITE , PWDATA = prev(PWDATA));
19: end constraint;
Figure 3.9: Minimal viable constraint suite enforcing APB protocol (in ITL)
niques such as [48] might be applicable.
The signal PSTRB used in the macro STRB (Fig. 3.10 line 9-24) is not part of
the APB protocol, but part of the AXI. It indicates which bytes will be actively
written or read during a transfer. It is used in the interconnect model to control
the hardware attachment. The correct value can be statically evaluated from the
provided hardware address and length of data.
3.6.2 Direct Register Access
In contrast to protocol emulation, interconnect based on direct register access
completely circumvents the bus interface provided by the peripheral. Instead, the
data is directly written or read from the targeted program-visible hardware registers
corresponding to the symbolic register used by the program.
The concept is illustrated in Fig. 3.11.
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1: macro expr READ :=
2: PENABLE && PSEL && ! PWRITE;
3: end macro;
4:
5: macro expr WRITE :=
6: PENABLE && PSEL && PWRITE;
7: end macro;
8:
9: macro expr STRB(expr addr, data) :=
10: if ( $length(data) == 8)
11: case (addr[1:0])
12: 2’b00: PSTRB == 4’b0001;
13: 2’b01: PSTRB == 4’b0010;
14: 2’b10: PSTRB == 4’b0100;
15: 2’b11: PSTRB == 4’b1000;
16: endcase;
17: elseif ($length(data) == 16)
18: case (addr[1:0])
19: 2’b00: PSTRB == 4’b0011;
20: 2’b10: PSTRB == 4’b1100;
21: endcase;
21: elseif ($length(data) == 32)




26: macro expr connect_read_port(expr addr, data) :=
27: READ && STRB(addr, data) &&
28: addr == PADDR && data == PRDATA;
29: end macro;
30:
31: macro expr connect_write_port(expr addr, data) :=
29: WRITE && STRB(addr, data) &&
30: addr == PADDR && data == PWDATA;
31: end macro;
Figure 3.10: Macro suite serving as API to construct a interconnect model follow-



































Figure 3.11: Direct Register Access conceptualized
If available, the property suite forming the direct register access can be automati-
cally generated from a description of the programmer’s view in the non-functional
data of the peripheral’s IP-XACT file. Without such a file at hand, creating the
properties involves inspection of the peripheral’s HDL code, because the naming
of the actual registers in the hardware may differ from their symbolic names in the
specification.
Implementing the interconnect via direct register access shows no significant
benefit in terms of the required time of a proof if the peripheral implementation
contains the logic of the bus interface (see Tab. 4.3 in Sec. 4.1.2).
This can be mainly attributed to the fact that the direct access properties merely
state what value a target register should have after a write communication or which
value should be read. How this value actually gets into the target register is still
restricted by the possible behavior of the hardware implementation. This leaves
the task of figuring out the correct input sequence at the bus interface up to the
proof engine. Hence, there are two main applications of direct register access:
The first are peripherals with a non-standard bus interface for which no protocol
emulation suite exists and the overhead of creating one is not justifiable due to
it being very complex. The second are peripherals whose bus interface logic is




Experiments and Case Studies
In order to evaluate the verification method presented in Chap. 3, several experi-
ments and case studies were performed. In this chapter, the setup, goal and results
of each such case study are reported.
The first set of experiments explores the general feasibility of the method, as well
as the effect of different modeling decisions on the complexity of the resulting
proofs. The second set of experiments applies the ACCESS device check (see
Sec. 3.5) to several open-source peripherals. Afterwards, the following case studies
on the global equivalence check are presented:
1. Driver variants for the PULPino GPIO with modified register interface
according to the method presented in [43]. The case study uses program
netlists and RTL models.
2. A Soft-SPI, i.e., a software-implemented serial peripheral interconnect (SPI),
using the PULPino GPIO. As software model program netlists, as well as




Table 4.1: Device data
peripheral state bits input bits output bits
Averaging-Filter 320 34 32
Aquarius UART 161 42 36
PULPino GPIO 320 81 324
PULPino SPI master 668 53 47
3. An industrial local interconnect (LIN) driver implementation using the Aquar-
ius [49] UART. The case study uses program netlists, but uses both RTL and
ESL models for the hardware model.
Data on the size of the RTL implementation of the peripherals used in these
experiments are shown in Tab. 4.1.
All experiments were performed on an Intel® Core™ i7-6700 CPU @ 3.40 GHz ×
8 with 32 GB of RAM running Linux and the OneSpin® 360 Design Verification
tool.
4.1 Performance Experiments
The experiments of this section are designed to show how overall proof performance
is affected by various decisions in the modeling process as well as configuration
parameters of the proof.
All tables contain the following metrics: The columns "time" and "memory" show
the CPU time and memory required by the solver. As the resources required for
checking an assertion depend on the complexity of the design and the assertion, it
is sometimes useful to understand this complexity. "Variables" refers to bit-level
variables in the cone of influence of the assertion, and "nodes" represent operators
used in the internal representation of the assertion. In addition to the operators
occurring within the assertion itself, all relevant portions of the design are also
taken into account. The size gives only a rough measure for complexity. For
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Table 4.2: Proof complexity depending on PN integration scheme
time (s) memory (MB) variables nodes
Segment cycles static unrolled % static unrolled % static unrolled % static unrolled %
A-5 24 7 9 22 2373 2728 13 56494 70016 19 310893 332916 7
A-10 39 21 24 13 2940 3868 24 92279 113121 18 514375 550109 6
A-15 54 38 47 19 3759 5750 35 128062 156224 18 717840 767283 6
A-20 69 56 71 21 4218 6236 32 163837 199319 18 921304 984457 6
B-5 44 46 60 23 3885 5011 22 105204 127550 18 587669 626196 6
B-10 79 161 200 20 5656 7255 22 188701 228127 17 1073037 1141089 6
B-15 114 364 698 48 7330 8500 14 272190 328696 17 1558317 1655888 6
B-20 149 1501 1638 8 8637 11709 26 355671 429257 17 2043701 2170792 6
instance, when the nodes include multiplication operators this will normally result
in much higher complexity than simple operators like Boolean logic or addition.
For one and the same design, though, two assertions with a similar "vars" and
"nodes" count can be expected to take similar run times.
4.1.1 Interconnect: Unrolled vs. Static PN
As stated in Sec. 3.6, the PN is a combinational representation of a sequential
circuit unrolled over time. Directly integrating it in the unified verification model
results in it being unrolled again along with the hardware model. This results in
redundant circuitry.
The experiment presented in this section is designed to show the influence of this
redundant unrolling on the overall problem size of an ACCESS-local proof instance
in comparison to a computational model where this redundancy is being avoided
by having a single, static PN. The data for the comparison of the two integration
methods is shown in Tab. 4.2.
Two different ACCESS-local proof instances A and B were given to the proof
engine. Instance A is located at the very beginning of the PN and contains a total
of three hardware accesses in a 2:1 split, i.e., one software variant performs two,
the other one a single access. Instance B is at the very end of the PN and contains
nine accesses in a 5:4 split. To generate further data points, each instance was
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Table 4.3: Proof complexity (measured by required computation time) depending
on chosen interconnect type
Interval 5 10 15 20
#accesses Protocol Direct % Protocol Direct % Protocol Direct % Protocol Direct %
1 3 s 2 s -50 6 s 5 s -20 15 s 22 s 32 28 s 22 s -27
2 4 s 6 s 33 26 s 19 s -37 43 s 42 s -2 55 s 95 s 42
3 14 s 10 s -40 60 s 57 s -5 90 s 115 s 22 235 s 230 s -2
4 22 s 24 s 8 120 s 173 s 31 335 s 399 s 16 493 s 894 s 45
5 42 s 44 s 5 328 s 228 s -44 777 s 475 s -64 1560 s 901 s -73
solved with the interval parameter set to the values 5, 10, 15 and 20, as denoted in
the trailing number in the "segment" column. The column "cycles" shows for how
many cycles the model had to be unrolled.
The data clearly shows an improvement across every metric when using the static
over the unrolled implementation scheme. On average the static scheme results in
a model that has 18% less variables, 6% less nodes, requires 24% less memory and
results in 22% faster proof times.
The proof instance’s location in the PN has no observable effect on any of the
metrics.
4.1.2 Protocol Emulation vs. Direct Register Access
Sec. 3.6 provides two different models on how to connect the software model to
the hardware model.
The data presented in Tab. 4.3 comes from an experiment exploring how the
chosen interconnect model affects proof performance. In the experiment ACCESS-
local checks with an increasing number of accesses (from 1 to 5) are performed.
Each check is performed once using protocol emulation and repeated using direct
register access. For further data points, the experiment is performed with the
interval parameter set to values 5, 10, 15 and 20.
No clear trend can be identified in the data gathered during the experiment. On
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Table 4.4: Impact of parameters on device check complexity
sequence interval time (h:m:s) memory (MB) variables nodes
2 4 00:00:09 773 804 2118
8 00:01:10 805 1092 4185
16 00:06:04 1250 1660 8318
32 00:28:03 1198 2788 16575
4 4 00:01:50 1059 1340 5408
8 00:15:58 1253 1916 11391
16 01:20:48 1749 3052 23356
32 06:20:49 2078 5308 47277
8 4 00:07:58 986 2428 16275
8 00:47:50 1661 3580 35802
16 03:47:20 1500 5852 74855
32 21:32:47 3650 10364 152952
average, using protocol emulation resulted in 5% faster proofs. Yet, with a standard
deviation of σ = 35% and relative proof time varying from −73% to 45%, no
predictable effect on proof performance increase by using one interconnect model
over the other could be observed. Performancewise there is no benefit of prefering
one scheme over the other. Yet, protocol emulation can be more easily adapted in a
generalized approach. Hence, all following experiments utilize protocol emulation
as its interconnect model.
4.1.3 Scalability Experiments
This set of experiments is directed at showing the impact of modeling uncertainty
in the timing of the arrival of an I/O access at the peripheral’s hardware interface.
The hardware is modeled at the RTL, the software, if applicable, at the binary level
by a program netlist.
We performed a series of ACCESS-local checks on a simple averaging-filter
peripheral. Its design is based on a shift register of length 10 and some arithmetic
logic to compute the average of the 32-bit shift register values. With more than 300
state bits it is reasonably sized to represent peripherals used in IoT applications.
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Table 4.5: Impact of parameters on local proof complexity
sequence interval time (h:m:s) memory (MB) variables nodes
2 4 00:00:05 744 804 2295
8 00:00:45 797 1092 4554
16 00:04:39 983 1660 9071
32 00:34:18 1215 2788 18096
4 4 00:00:02 343 1340 5955
8 00:00:08 920 1916 12578
16 00:00:48 1034 3052 25823
32 00:05:37 1224 5308 52304
8 4 00:00:14 987 2428 18138
8 00:02:00 1045 3580 39969
16 00:11:11 1254 5852 83630
32 00:55:54 1763 10364 170943
The register interface is generic without any consideration to specific peripheral bus
protocols. It imposes very few constraints on access patterns so that the property
proof instances grow with the “pure” size of the problem and are not influenced
much by the growing complexity of the access constraints.
For each parameter set (interval size, sequence length) the device was subjected
once to the ACCESS device check and once to the ACCESS-local verification step.
Remember that many such ACCESS-local verification steps compose the ACCESS-
global verification of Sec. 3.3. The PNs for ACCESS-local were generated from
a simple program which generates a series of input values for the device from
a seed value. In this experiment the program is intentionally simple and we use
the same program for both PN instances of the device miter of Fig. 3.4. This is
because we do not address global equivalence verification, but focus on examining
the scalability of the individual ACCESS-local verification steps and the ACCESS
device checks. The grace period was set to 5 cycles. Performance data for our
method are listed in Tab. 4.4 and Tab. 4.5. The columns “sequence” and “interval”
refer to the number of device accesses and to the maximal number of clock cycles
between accesses, respectively. As expected, the proof complexity grows the more
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combinations of accesses and idle cycles must be enumerated. This is also clearly
reflected in the number of created SAT variables and nodes, as reported by the
property checker. The column labeled “variables” gives the number of Boolean
variables in the proof instance while “nodes” (next column) represents Boolean
operators in the proof instance. As opposed to the ACCESS device check, the
device miter for the ACCESS-local verification step is constrained by the PNs. This
has only minor impact on the size of the SAT instance (see 3.6), but greatly reduces
the required proof time. The ACCESS local verification step and the ACCESS
device check can be considered the bottleneck for our global approach in terms of
computational complexity. The shown results promise that the proposed approach
is feasible for realistic device sizes in many IoT applications.
4.2 ACCESS device checks
The ACCESS device check as proposed in Sec. 3.5.1.1 has been applied to three
open-source standard peripherals: the General Purpose Input/Output (GPIO) and
Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) master peripherals, as included within the RISC-V-
based PULPino [50] platform, and the UART of the Aquarius Open Core SoC [49].
The PULPino peripherals are designed to interface with the AMBA APB (without
wait states), the Aquarius peripheral adheres to the open-source Wishbone bus
interface. A set of protocol constraints model the compliance of the interface
with the respective communication protocol. Theses constraint sets had to be
defined manually, which took roughly one hour per set. They can be reused for any
peripheral utilizing the respective protocol. The initial setup of the experiment, i.e.,
generating the wrapper module for unrolling the device hardware and creating the
ACCESS property, takes only a couple of seconds as it is fully automated.
Interestingly, in the pursuit of our experiments, we discovered multiple implicit
assumptions made by the device w.r.t. how it will be accessed that were not
mentioned by the documentation of the hardware device. For the SPI we detected
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Table 4.6: ACCESS device check performance
peripheral interval time (h:m:s) memory (MB)
Aquarius UART 2 00:01:17 2316
PULPino SPI 2 00:03:01 6155
PULPino GPIO 4 00:02:28 1248
that any write to the peripheral during an active transmission can possibly lead to
divergent behavior of both HW instances of the device miter, i.e., the behavior of the
peripheral is different for access patterns generated from the same access sequence.
This is valuable information for the firmware developer, because mechanisms must
be implemented to ensure that the code avoids creating such a pattern. Furthermore,
we detected that the peripheral’s software reset is currently not implemented. This
is denoted in the HDL code itself, but not in the documentation. The GPIO did
behave as described in its documentation.
Additionally, we were able to detect a so far unknown bug in the open-source
UART. The UART controls its baud rate with a number of internal counters,
which reset to zero if a configurable target value is reached. Due to the UART’s
asynchronous nature, these counters are always advancing, whether a transmission
is currently going on or not. The bug may occur when reconfiguring the baud
rate of the UART such that the target value Thigh is replaced by smaller target
value Tlow. If this change happens while the counter value is in between those
two values Tlow < Vcounter < Thigh the internal counter will not be properly reset
until it overflows, wraps around and reaches Tlow again. This renders the UART
unresponsive to the environment for up to 218 clock cycles. It is not possible for the
Software (SW) to avoid this, as there is no way by which it could infer the current
value of the internal counter.
Tab. 4.6 shows the average performance data of our tool for detecting a constraint
or bug in each device, i.e., the CPU time spent until a counterexample is found.
The sequence length in all cases was set to 2, the grace period was set to 5. Since
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no bugs or assumptions were found in the case of the GPIO, the table lists the effort
required to prove equivalence of an arbitrary access sequences. Note that it is not
necessary to proof the equivalence of arbitrary access sequences with the ACCESS
Device Check, but only to identify the constraints required for the ACCESS-local
verification step.
Besides avoiding spurious counterexamples in ACCESS-global, our results show
that the ACCESS Device Check may also be useful as a stand-alone verification
technique for a given peripheral. It identifies undocumented restrictions for SW
using this peripheral that may cause bugs if neglected. Moreover, subtle HW bugs
of the peripheral may also be identified.
4.3 Case Study: Register Interface Optimization of
PULPino GPIO
The case study in this section is the results of a collaborative effort between the
author of this thesis and the authors of [43].
In current industrial practice, developers of low-level software (e.g., drivers) stand
before the difficult task of implementing the intended driver behavior, while ad-
hering to the peripheral’s register layout and simultaneously ensuring good per-
formance and a small memory footprint. To avoid polluting the source code with
macros and bit manipulation operations, a Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) is
introduced. Its purpose is to hide register-layout-specific code like shifting and
masking operations behind easily recognizable functions. The drawback of the
HAL approach is a possible loss of performance and an increased memory footprint
if the chosen register layout and HAL functions are not aligned with the driver
behavior.
[43] introduces a DSL-based flow built on top of the C language, with which the
developer can define the peripherals register interface in an abstract form as bit
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fields and state side effects of the targeted hardware. With this information, the
amount of memory barriers introduced in the code via the volatile keyword can
be reduced, enabling further optimization by the compiler and resulting in a more
efficient binary. Additionally, the designer can create and exploit hierarchical
bit field declarations and arrays to write high-level code that is free from bit
manipulation, effectively reducing his workload.
From this high-level code a register layout optimization of the peripheral can be
derived that is based on the actual control and data flow of the software.
Three variants of an application software addressing the systems GPIO were
provided by the authors of [43]. These variants are further referred to as V 0, V 1
and V 2. Each variant is based on the same high-level code, but differs from the
others in the implementation of its HAL layer as well as the register layout of the
GPIO peripheral.
Applying the ACCESS verification method to check equivalence between the
different variants initially showed that none of the provided variants were equivalent.
Manual inspection of the provided counterexamples of the failed ACCESS-local
proofs quickly revealed incorrect read/write alignments in the modified register
interface of V 0 and V 2. For V 0 this affected register INTTYPE1, for V 2 the whole
gpio_padcfg register bank. The authors of [43] confirmed these findings.
Furthermore, a missing side effect annotation in V 0 introduced a race condition
for the gpio_in register, which in turn could potentially lead to the peripheral
incorrectly raising an interrupt. It was confirmed that this was not an intentionally
placed bug, having passed previously employed simulation-based verification
efforts.
Finding a counterexample for these bugs took, in all cases, roughly two minutes.
After fixing the detected bugs, repeating the ACCESS verification showed the
variants to be functionally equivalent. Performance data for the verification runs is
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Table 4.7: Proof run times and memory usage for showing equivalence of the
provided software variants (post bug fixes). Each row corresponds to an
ACCESS-local check.
V0⇔ V1 V0⇔ V2 V1⇔ V2
Accesses Time Memory Accesses Time Memory Accesses Time Memory
2:1 6 s 2366 MB 2:2 8 s 2154 MB 1:2 7 s 2373 MB
2:1 8 s 2366 MB 2:2 9 s 2154 MB 1:2 8 s 2339 MB
2:1 7 s 2366 MB 2:2 8 s 2282 MB 1:2 7 s 2373 MB
2:1 7 s 2087 MB 2:2 6 s 2039 MB 1:2 6 s 2339 MB
1:1 5 s 2198 MB 1:2 5 s 2234 MB 1:2 7 s 2339 MB
1:1 5 s 2196 MB 1:2 7 s 2271 MB 1:2 10 s 2221 MB
1:1 7 s 2196 MB 1:2 5 s 2299 MB 1:2 6 s 2121 MB
1:1 3 s 1846 MB 1:1 4 s 1940 MB 1:1 9 s 2443 MB
5:4 42 s 2869 MB 5:6 53 s 3995 MB 4:6 49 s 3884 MB
5:4 40 s 3442 MB 5:6 51 s 3954 MB 4:6 41 s 3884 MB
5:4 53 s 2994 MB 5:6 60 s 4138 MB 4:6 57 s 4142 MB
5:4 40 s 2559 MB 5:6 48 s 3736 MB 4:6 46 s 3885 MB
shown in Tab. 4.7.
4.4 Case Study: HW/SW-Optimized Soft-SPI Imple-
mentation
This section presents results of a case study in checking HW/SW co-equivalence
between variants of an interrupt-driven Software-implemented Serial Peripheral
Interface (Soft-SPI) slave for the RISC-V based PULPino platform. The case study
is repeated at both levels of software abstraction: binary and source-code level.
The Soft-SPI emulates a SPI slave peripheral via “bit banging” on the PULPino
General Purpose Input/Output (GPIO) peripheral. The protocol requires four
dedicated I/O pins: Synchronous Clock (SCK), Slave Select (SS), Master-In-Slave-
Out (MISO) and Master-Out-Slave-In (MOSI). Fig. 4.1 shows the timing diagram
of the protocol for an 8-bit duplex transmission as well as the three phases defined
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SCK
SS
MISO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 zz
MOSI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 zz
I WR WR WR WR WR WR WR WR R I
Figure 4.1: SPI Protocol Timing Diagram. Colors highlight different phases as
used in the Soft-SPI.
Table 4.8: GPIO pad configurations for the Soft-SPI phases
Idle (I) Prepare-for-Read (R) Prepare-for-Write (W)
Pad PADDIR INTEN Trigger* PADDIR INTEN Trigger* PADDIR INTEN Trigger*
SCK IN disabled high IN enabled high IN enabled low
SS IN enabled low IN enabled high IN enabled high
MISO IN disabled - OUT disabled - OUT disabled -
MOSI IN disabled - IN disabled - IN disabled -
*high: INTTYPE0=0, INTTYPE1=1, low: INTTYPE0=1, INTTYPE1=1
by the Soft-SPI slave: Idle (I), Prepare-for-Read (R) and Prepare-for-Write (W).
The functions of the GPIO pads are defined by four control registers. Each control
register holds four bits that are each associated with one of the four GPIO pads.
Each pad can be configured independently by setting the bits associated with it
in the four registers. Register PADDIR sets a pad’s function as input or output,
register INTEN enables interrupts, and registers INTTYPE0 and INTTYPE1 control
the interrupt triggering behavior. A GPIO pad needs to be initialized after reset
and/or reconfigured according to the current phase of the Soft-SPI. Tab. 4.8 shows
the configurations for each pad in each protocol phase.
The Soft-SPI defines one Interrupt Service Routine (ISR) for each phase, ISRidle,
ISRR and ISRW . Besides servicing interrupts, ISRidle is also used for initialization
of the peripheral. ISRR is called for two different interrupt events, depending on
the driver state. Fig. 4.2 shows the resulting FW call graph.
We examined three variants of the Soft-SPI: unpacked, SW-packed and HW/SW-
packed. All use the same set of GPIO pads. Because the software uses only a
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Figure 4.2: Soft-SPI call graph
subset of the available pads, each write access to a register must be preceded by
a read access and by creation of an appropriate bit mask for selecting the used
pads. This prevents the write accesses from affecting pads that are possibly used
by other applications. In the sequel, we will refer to these two steps as a joined
Read-Modify-Write (RMW) operation. All variants require one RMW to write
data to MISO in ISRR, a normal read access to MOSI in ISRW as well as a read
access of the interrupt status register at each interrupt. These are not included in
the following descriptions.
The first variant, unpacked, uses the GPIO driver provided with the PULPino
platform, in which each bit in a GPIO register must be set by its own RMW. This
requires at least 12 RMW operations in ISRidle, three in ISRR and one in ISRW .
The next variant SW-packed exploits the fact that the FW can simultaneously
configure the same control parameter for multiple pads in a single RMW operation.
Hence, the RMW operations in ISRidle are reduced to 4 (one for each control
register). ISRR and ISRW remain unaffected because the accesses are all distributed
over different registers, leaving no room for optimizations.
While in variant SW-packed only the FW was optimized, both the FW and the
HW are modified in variant HW/SW-packed. The optimization achieved in variant
HW/SW-packed is possible due to changes in the GPIO’s addressing scheme. In
the PULPino SoC the complete address space from 0x1A101000 to 0x1A101ffff is
reserved for the GPIO peripheral, but only the address space from 0x1A101000
to 0x1A10103C is actually used. We use this to introduce a new option to the
peripheral’s hardware register interface at address 0x1A101100. The new option is
conceptually presented in Fig. 4.3 and allows all pads that are used by the Soft-SPI
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SCK SS MISO MOSI Adding new address to register interface
Figure 4.3: New GPIO control register addressing scheme after HW modification.











Figure 4.4: Normalized number of configuration accesses to the GPIO by the Soft-
SPI variants to transmit x data bits.
to be configured simultaneously with only a single 16-bit write access. Hence, this
variant only needs to perform a single write access in each ISR.
Fig. 4.4 shows the normalized effect of the optimization on the amount of accesses
required to reconfigure the GPIO in order to transmit a certain number of bits. We
can see that both optimized variants have a significant effect on the number of
required I/O accesses, especially for a low number of transmitted bits.
In order to verify the equivalence of the variants with ACCESS, the division of
the code into ISRs provides a natural sequence mapping. During PN generation
the maximum number of bits per transmission was set to one. This is sufficient to
exhaustively explore all transitions in the FW call graph. The HW modifications to
the GPIO do not add or remove any of HW ports or registers. Hence, no additional
action has to be taken to map HW states.
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Table 4.9: Experimental results of equivalence checks between Soft-SPI variants
Program Netlist Source Code Relative Change
variant segment time memory time memory time memory
unpacked ISRidle 748 s 4881 MB 722 s 4623 MB 3% 5%
⇔ ISRR 127 s 3148 MB 132 s 2972 MB -4% 6%
SW-packed ISRW 68 s 2347 MB 62 s 2224 MB 9% 5%
unpacked ISRidle 307 s 3539 MB 321 s 3264 MB -5% 8%
⇔ ISRR 88 s 2794 MB 84 s 2621 MB 5% 6%
HW/SW-packed ISRW 15 s 2357 MB 14 s 2214 MB 7% 6%
SW-packed ISRidle 195 s 3939 MB 201 s 3623 MB -3% 8%
⇔ ISRR 74 s 2793 MB 78 s 2645 MB -5% 5%
HW/SW-packed ISRW 13 s 2357 MB 13 s 2183 MB 0% 7%
All variants could be proven to be equivalent to each other under the equivalence
notion of ACCESS. Proofs were performed assuming a maximum delay of 4 cycles
per access and a grace period of 5 cycles.
The experiments of this case study were performed once using a PN to model the
software and once more as a source code model as presented in 3.4.
The data on the individual proofs shown in Tab. 4.9 indicates no significant differ-
ence in computation time and minor improvement of 5 percent as a result from
using the source code model instead of the program netlist.
A possible explanation for this reduced memory footprint could be that the software
model is created on the granularity of the API calls, e.g., the source code model for
ISRidle contains only the relevant code for this specific code section, whereas the
netlist is always included as a whole. On the other hand, the source code model
must be constructed from the provided API calls. Due to the way the model is
synthesized and integrated in the used verification software, these API calls also
form the smallest comparable segment. Hence, it is not possible to further split
the ACCESS-local check of ISRidle into smaller ones, which is expected to have
significant impact on proof performance (see Tab. 4.5).
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4.5 Case Study: Industrial LIN
The Local Interconnect Network (LIN) bus [51] is a serial network protocol that
was originally developed for communication between components in vehicles.
With an increasing number of devices distributed in modern cars, the CAN bus
quickly became too expensive to implement for every such component. LIN was
developed as an inexpensive alternative relying on cost-efficient hardware and
only a single wire. It is intended as a second hierarchical network layer, usually
complementing an existing CAN network.
Data is transferred across the bus as messages in form of a predefined frame. The
frame consists of two parts: the header and the response. Both of these parts can
further be divided in more specific parts. A LIN frame is shown in Fig. 4.5.
0 - 8 data fields ChecksumSynch Break Synch ID
ResponseHeader
Figure 4.5: LIN frame: Header and Response with respective sub-parts
This case study exercises the verification approach of ACCESS-global on four
variants of an industrial Local Interconnect Network (LIN) driver implementation
compiled for and run on a model of the Aquarius Open Core SoC and its UART.
The variants differ in the way the driver initializes and reconfigures the UART
during runtime. Variant LIN-A serves as the golden model. In its initialization
sequence, it performs two 8-bit writes, followed by sequentially setting two flag
bits. The writing of the bits involves first reading the respective byte, creating a
bit mask, modifying the value and writing the modified value back, in order to not
override the other bits of the addressed byte. This procedure is further referred to
as read-modify-write. All these accesses are to different parts of the same 32-bit
configuration register. In an attempt to reduce the number of I/O instructions in the
other driver variants, these accesses are combined. Variant LIN-B combines the
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Table 4.10: ACCESS-global for industrial LIN
PN generation Proof time † (m:s)
Variant time∗ (m:s) RTL PPA Result
LIN-A / LIN-B 3:38 7:32 0:15 Hold
LIN-A / LIN-C 3:23 5:05 0:10 Fail
LIN-A / LIN-D 3:52 5:51 0:12 Fail
∗ Longest generation time of both PNs
† Proofs are independent and can be parallelized
first two 8-bit writes to a single 16-bit write and the two read-modify-write to a
single one. Variant LIN-C combines all accesses to a single 32-bit read-modify-
write. Last, LIN-D combines the first two 8-bit writes to a single 16-bit write, just
like LIN-B, but performs a 16-bit read-modify-write. This optimization is done
so that the initialization and reconfiguration procedures can both utilize the same
code segment.
All variants are equivalent from the programmer’s view, as each of their modified
segments leads to identical memory states of the SW-visible registers of the HW
after they have been executed. Yet, as ACCESS-global reveals, variants LIN-C
and LIN-D result in erroneous behavior, namely an unintended transmission, due
to violating an implicit assumption by the UART. Writing to the lowest byte of
the UART configuration register automatically triggers a transmission of this byte,
even though its value hasn’t changed due to the read-modify-write mechanism.
LIN-C and LIN-D fail in considering this side effect of the hardware. The PNs
generated for LIN-A, LIN-B and LIN-C contain the initialization segment exactly
once and reconfiguration segment four times. The PN of LIN-D contains no distinct
initialization, but five reconfiguration segments, as it utilizes the same method for
both tasks. This requires ACCESS-global to perform five non-trivial ACCESS-
local verification steps for all LIN variants. These can be performed independently,
and thus can be parallelized. Tab. 4.10 therefore shows the proof time for the most
time-consuming ACCESS-local verification for each LIN variant.
86













Figure 4.6: Conceptual PPA Model of the Aquarius UART
The experiments of this case study were performed twice: once with the RTL im-
plementation of the Aquarius UART serving as the hardware model and once more
with a corresponding PPA model. The PPA model consists of four independent
sub-models: one handling the behavior of the receiver, one for the transmitter, a
control unit and a model for the register interface. The register interface translates
(address, data) pairs into requests for the behavioral part of the model and keeps
track of the peripherals configuration. For example, a write access from the bus
to the UARTS’s TX register will trigger a write request from the interface to the
control module with the same data, whereas a write access to any control register
will trigger a configuration request. The value of the configuration, e.g., a change
of the baud rate, is stored in the register interface but not forwarded in the request.
The behavioral model answers in turn with a set of abstract responses.
On this model, two access sequences are equivalent if they result in identical values
in the respective register interface and an identical sequence of messages over TX.
The first three form the abstract behavior model which communicates with the
register interface via predefined requests and responses.
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The results for both versions of ACCESS-global can be found in Tab. 4.10. Thanks
to a preceding ACCESS Device Check no spurious counterexamples can occur
in the version using the RTL implementation. The same holds true for the one
using the PPA, within the granularity of the abstraction. Therefore, with ACCESS
we were able to quickly identify the incorrect LIN variants by generating true
counterexamples in short time. Similarly, the equivalence of variants LIN-A and
LIN-B could be proven without approaching the scalability limits of our approach.
The data further shows a significant improvement when using the SystemC-PPA
model instead of the RTL model. This can be attributed to the large sequential
depth of the UART’S RTL model, which the SystemC-PPA model is able to nearly
completely abstract away.
Yet, the SystemC-PPA model comes with another sort of investment. To begin
with, as a default the model is not readily available and must first be created.
Additionally, not every SystemC-PPA is suitable to be used for every equivalence
check. During model creation, special attention and thought must be put into
retaining all information necessary in the proof, e.g., in the model above the
register file is still crucial. Finally, current tooling has only limited support for
SystemC verification (or the way SystemC-PPA is modeled is not well coordinated
with the provided support). This leads to additional manual effort for adapting a
SystemC-PPA model to work with commercially available tools.
The cost of the SystemC-PPA’s manual creation and addaption must first be amor-
tized by the speedup gained by using a SystemC-PPA model over an equivalent
RTL model. As can be seen in Tab. 4.10, this speedup is quite significant.
Future efforts in automized model creation and integration will further reduce the




Cycle-Accurate Timing Extension for
Program Netlists
Our experiments (see Sec. 4.1.3) indicate that uncertainty in the timing of each
access in an access sequence, modeled by the intervall parameter, strongly affects
the complexity of the required local proofs. This is not surprising as an increase in
the variability in an access sequences leads to a potentially exponential increase of
the modeled access patterns. Hence, eliminating or reducing the uncertainty in the
timing of an access should be beneficial to the scalability and performance of the
HW/SW-co-verification approach presented in the previous chapters.
This chapter proposes an optional, fully automated approach to generate a clock
cycle-accurate view of the software. The generated model is a modified version
of a PN (see Sec. 2.1.4). It is fully compositional with RTL hardware and ex-
tends the scope of standard techniques for hardware verification to also efficiently
examine the software and its interaction with the hardware at a cycle-accurate
granularity w.r.t. to the behavior of the processor. This is achieved by interleaving
standard PN model generation with existing techniques of Worst-Case-Execution-
Time (WCET) analysis to create a cycle-accurate model for programs running on
89
5.1. Cycle-accurate SW modeling
pipelined processors.
The proposed approach builds upon the previous approaches in [13, 52]. These
works present an algorithm to annotate a PN with timing information from which a
model for cycle-accurate formal verification of low-level software can be created.
The algorithm is only applicable to simple processors that are not susceptible to
the problems posed for WCET computation by modern architectures mentioned in
Sec. 2.2. In contrast, the approach presented in this chapter is capable of coping
with many of these more sophisticated architectures and the complications they
cause in WCET computation.
Similar to other WCET approaches, the one proposed in this chapter is based on
formulating timing analysis as an ILP problem. The effects of complex microar-
chitectural features in modern processors on the WCET have also been studied
in detail in the literature. For example, [53] considers the influences of caches
and speculative execution, and [54] studies pipelined out-of-order processors. The
presented approach applies the findings of the rich body of research of WCET
computation on the program netlist as computational model. The program netlist
already contains a lot of information in an explicit way, which in other approaches
must first be computed during the ILP solving process. This significantly reduces
the complexity of computing the solution to the ILP problem. The ACCESS verifi-
cation approach and the proposed WCET computation approach complement each
other in that both (can) use the program netlist. Hence, there is no additional cost
for creating a program netlist.
5.1 Cycle-accurate SW modeling
In order for timing analysis of software to be precise and feasible, we need an
accurate model of the computing hardware as well as the software running on
it [53, 55]. Two aspects are essential.
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First, any timing analysis needs to consider detailed microarchitectural behavior
in order to be sufficiently precise. The computational model must represent the
timing-relevant behavior of the targeted microarchitecture. Obtaining such a model
can be challenging, depending on the complexity of the target as well as the
availability of a sufficiently detailed documentation. Model generation may be a
manual or an automated process, e.g., by harvesting simulation traces [56].
Software given at the source level is usually not suitable for a precise static analysis,
as its high level of abstraction does not provide the information needed to factor
in microarchitectural effects, such as data or structural hazards. Therefore, timing
analysis should be performed on the machine code level.
Second, when analyzing a sequence of machine instructions, some notion of context
is required. For example, the execution time of a loop or subroutine may differ
significantly between iterations or may depend on the background from which it
was called.
Given a sufficiently detailed model of the microarchitecture, as well as the software
at the binary level, timing analysis can be broken down into two basic steps:
• Restricting the state space of the analysis by pruning infeasible execution
paths and deriving upper bounds on the number of loop executions. Usually
the Control Flow Graph (CFG) of the program serves as starting point for
this step.
• Computing the timing information based on the previous step under consid-
eration of the underlying microarchitectural model.
For the first step, we make use of the EXG which is an intermediate representation
produced during PN generation (see Sec. 2.1.4). Generating an EXG from a CFG
already requires to check the liveness of a given path, effectively exluding infeasible
paths from the EXG. For the second step, we can fall back to the classical solution
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G1 G2
G3
Figure 5.1: Partitioning the EXG for ILP resulting in three trees and showing the
context prefixes for G2 (for length 2)
of formulating the task as an ILP problem (see Sec. 2.1.1). Although current ILP
solvers are very powerful it is still sensible to ease the ILP solver’s computational
load as much as possible.
Fortunately, using the EXG as the computational base model for the analysis allows
for several optimizations that keep the problem complexity benign. First, an EXG
G = {V,E} can be easily partitioned into a minimal, partially ordered set of
sub-graphs {G1, . . . , Gn|G = ∪Gi,∀i, j, i 6= j : Gi ∩ Gj = ∅}, such that each
Gi is a tree. This is achieved by cutting G at all incoming edges e ∈ Ein(v) of a
vertex v ∈ V with |Ein(v)| > 1. As illustrated in the partitioning of Fig. 5.1, cut
points correspond to points where one or more paths merge. Instead of creating
and solving a single large ILP problem for the whole EXG, we create and solve
many small ILP problems for the sub-trees in the EXG. This leads to a substantial
boost in performance.
The ILP formulation benefits additionally from the following observation. Nodes
in a path in the EXG are strictly ordered. Interdependencies between nodes exist be-
cause the corresponding instructions influence each other in the processor pipeline.
Direct interdependencies between instructions are, however, limited by the length
of the pipeline, and are therefore local. We can model these interdependencies in
the ILP formulation using strict inequality constraints. This simplifies the general
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ILP problem such that it can be solved in polynomial time [3].
While the EXG model contains the necessary information regarding the software it
does not include the effects of the target microarchitecture. We therefore extend
the EXG model with a microarchitectural model. This model does not capture any
functional behavior but only the interdependencies of instructions in the pipeline.
It consists of a set of instruction constraints definitions (ICDs) describing the
constraints that are inflicted upon the operation of the pipeline by the execution
semantics of the instruction. Examples are the ordering of pipeline stages and
effects of pipeline hazards. An ICD is a template for a set of inequality constraints
written in terms of template variables representing the scheduling of the pipeline
stages. When generating the ILP problem we instantiate for each instruction in
the EXG a set of pipeline constraints from the corresponding template. Some
constraints in the template are conditional. They are instantiated only if the
condition is met, e.g., a data hazard exists with another instruction currently in the
pipeline.
The following example illustrates the modeling of a small sequence of two instruc-
tions as an ILP problem. Consider the following program consisting of two ADD
instructions, with a data hazard between them.
ADD R1, R1, R2 ; A1
ADD R1, R1, R1 ; A2
The ICD of the ADD instruction for the target architecture, assuming a 3-stage
pipeline, consists of the following set of constraints.
1: stages← {IF,EX,WB};
2: constraints :
3: I.IF < I.EX,
4: I.EX < I.WB,
5: I.IF < (I+1).IF,
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6: if I.registers ∩ (I+1).registers 6= ∅ then
7: I.WB < (I+1).EX
8: end if
Note that the last constraint is conditional. The condition is used to model a data
hazard between the current and the next instruction in the pipeline.
As stated above, we create a new ILP problem instance for each tree in the EXG.
This is done by building a directed weighted graph H = (S,C) called the ICD
graph. The nodes S represent the set of variables instantiated by the ICD templates
for each instruction in the tree. The instantiated variables represent the time points
at which a particular instruction is in a particular stage of the pipeline. The edges C
represent the sets of variables corresponding to each instantiated constraint.
The graphH is weighted so that individual execution times of the pipeline stages
can be modeled. The incorporation of the node weights in the generation of the
ILP problem is straightforward and is not discussed here.
For generating the ILP problem, each node of a tree is visited and the corresponding
ICD template is instantiated. Conditional ICD constraints are instantiated only if
the condition is true, e.g., a hazard exists between the current instruction and other
instructions in the tree.
AfterH has been constructed it is translated to the general ILP formulation (2.1)
in a straightforward fashion.
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In our running example, the translation process creates the following ILP problem:
1 −1 0 0 0 0
0 1 −1 0 0 0
1 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 1 0 −1 0
0 0 0 1 −1 0





















1 1 1 1 1 1
)
resulting in xᵀ =
(
1 2 3 2 4 5
)
As can be seen in the example, each variable x ∈ xᵀ represents a distinct instruction
and pipeline stage. The variable’s value in the solution is the clock cycle in which
the instruction is in the respective pipeline stage. The matrix A defines the set of
precedence constraints between pipeline stages and instructions. More intricate
constraints can be created following well known ILP formulation schemes, see,
e.g., [57]. In our example, each stage executes in exactly one cycle, therefore all
values in b are simply set to 0. The elements of the cost vector cᵀ are all set to 1
because there is no priority of one constraint over the other.
The approach is based on the assumption that the internal instruction scheduling of
the processor inserts pipeline “bubbles” only if necessary, i.e., an instruction enters
a pipeline stage as early as possible.
It is important to retain the context in which a particular section of the program is
executed in order to obtain accurate timing information. Instead of considering an
ILP formulation obtained from a constraint graph in isolation, apart from the rest
of the program, we need to model the context by an additional set of constraints or
boundary conditions called the context prefix in the sequel.
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The context prefix ensures that the timing values and pipeline states of possible
entry points from preceding trees are considered when solving the current prob-
lem. The set of trees in an EXG is topologically sorted. If we visit the trees in
topological order, we can compute timing values based on context prefixes that
have already been computed for trees visited earlier. Hence, each context prefix
can be represented by the initial concrete constraints associated with the pipeline
stages affecting it, but with the bound vector b updated with timing values already
computed for trees in the fan-in. The solution for a given pair of a tree and a
context-prefix is used to create a timed graph. This graph is structurally identical
to the analyzed tree, however each node is weighted by the delay the instruction
produces relative to its predecessor. The overall analysis result T = {∪Ti} is
pruned by merging isomorphic subgraphs. This is done in an interleaved fashion.
The complete analysis can be performed by the following algorithm:
1: procedure ANALYSIS(EXG, arch)
2: T ← new timed graph
3: partition EXG into trees
4: create NOP context prefix for trees with no predecessor
5: while some tree not solved do
6: if tree is ready then
7: create constraint graphH of tree
8: for all context prefixes P of tree do
9: time← solve (P ∪H) with ILP-solver
10: create Ti from tree+ time







5.2. Case Study: Local Interconnect Bus (LIN)
Analyzing a system with advanced microarchitectural features such as caches,
out-of-order pipelines and branch prediction, is possible. Branch prediction can
be modeled via modifying the EXG to contain paths for either correct and false
prediction. For caches, it must be assumed that the pipeline does not progress in
the case of a cache miss. Thus, the latency of the LOAD/STORE instruction can be
simply incremented by a value provided from an appropriate cache model. Finally,
out-of-order pipelines are assumed to still have a fixed order concerning fetch,
decode and write-back. The flexible order regarding their execution is modeled by
simply omitting the respective precedence constraints.
5.2 Case Study: Local Interconnect Bus (LIN)
Using the proposed technique, we created cycle-accurate program netlists for the
industrial LIN of 4.5. As a reminder, LIN is a low-level driver for an automotive
communication protocol. We used an industrial implementation of the driver
by Infineon Technologies AG, for a LIN master node. The driver was ported
to the open-source target Aquarius which implements the SH-2 instruction set
architecture. The driver comprises about 1350 lines of C code and can be configured
such that transmission and reception modes are allowed, data length is variable up
to 8 bytes, and the used IDs can be modified by the application. The driver interacts
with the LIN bus by means of a UART peripheral providing status, configuration
and data registers. The UART is accessible as a memory-mapped I/O device.
The driver interacts with the application via shared memory holding receive and
transmit data as well as status information. All program netlists generated for the
driver support these features.
We compiled the software into two binaries by using two different compiler options
for optimization (O0 and O1).
Table 5.1 shows the results for model generation for each of the two binaries. The
first three columns show the sizes of the CFG and EXG by number of machine
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5.2. Case Study: Local Interconnect Bus (LIN)
Table 5.1: Performance evaluation data
CFG EXG path MG TA
SW size size count time (s) time (s)
lin-o0 1168 4835 44538 26.8 3.9
lin-o1 703 2408 17406 12.4 0.9
TA: timing analysis, MG: model generation
instructions. The third column gives the number of execution paths modeled by the
EXG. The last two columns show the CPU times needed for generating the EXG
model and computing the cycle-accurate timing information, respectively.
For ILP solving we used the GNU linear programming kit (glpk), with default
settings. As can be seen, the computational overhead of computing cycle-accurate
timing information for the program netlists is small.
Integrating cycle-accurate PN in the HW/SW system is usually not necessary be-
cause the uncertainty in timing introduced by the bus system generally supersedes
that of the CPU. Yet, the additional timing information can possibly be used in
the ACCESS verification method to narrow down the timing variability between
two accesses. Our experiments (see. 4.1.3) have already shown that this variability
greatly affects the overall proof complexity. The extent to which we may ben-
efit from a cycle-accurate PN strongly depends on the SW application and the
predictability of the timing of the bus system.
Finally, it is worthwhile noting that a cycle accurate PN, besides its potential
performance benefits, can form the basis for extending firmware verification to




This thesis presented ACCESS, a novel method for proving the correctness of code
transformations which modify a firmware I/O sequence accessing a peripheral
device.
ACCESS achieves this by accepting that neither the software nor the peripheral of
each instance of the HW/SW-system needs to be equivalent on its own as long as
the observable behavior of the whole system is.
Showing this equivalence is rather complex; for the general case too complex to be
feasible for realistic designs. ACCESS mitigates this complexity partly by partition-
ing the proof of global equivalence into a set of localized proofs on the hardware,
while including the global context into the analysis using a sound abstraction of the
software. The computational complexity of the localized proofs is further reduced
by only unrolling until an equivalent hardware state (module timing) is reached in
the hardware instead of showing the equivalence of the whole hardware operation.
ACCESS defines a unifying verification model which integrates hardware, soft-
ware and the connecting bus into a single model. The unifying model is designed
to allow each component to be modeled at different levels of abstraction. The
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supported (sub-)models were discussed and experimentally evaluated.
No significant difference in proof performance could be shown between the two
proposed models for abstracting the interconnect. The same holds true for the
available software models, i.e., program netlists and source code, with the soft-
ware model showing only a minor improvement in memory consumption. This
improvement is bought with more constraints w.r.t. to the sequence mappings,
possibly leading to overall decreased performance. Future work will explore
whether this effect becomes more pronounced with increasing program size. In
contrast to the other sub-models, having a suitable SystemC-PPA model available
for the examined peripheral dramatically reduces the required time for proofing
equivalence between two systems. Unfortunately, these models are not (yet) read-
ily available. Defining one and integrating it into the verification environment
currently requires considerable effort by the verification engineer, due to lack of
compatibility between the available tools.
The potential of the PPA – not only as an effective verification model, but also as a
possible bridge of the semantic gap and, hence, as a new design entry point – was
recently recognized by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and
Energy (BMWi). This recognition resulted in us receiving the ’EXIST Transfer of
Research’ grant for the development of a commercial PPA tool and the potential
founding of a spin-off.
Our results show that the method scales well for realistic components of small and
mid-size computing platforms, as they have gained great popularity in IoT systems.
In addition, the proposed method proved effective in identifying subtle bugs in the
peripheral HW and undocumented constraints relevant for firmware development.
The method would strongly benefit from improved tool support w.r.t. to debugging
counterexamples and the integration of SystemC-PPA models.
We have further shown that the availability of an EXG, as defined in previous
work [13], allows for a new and efficient formulation of ILP-based timing analysis.
100
By a combination of EXG generation with ILP-based timing analysis a substantial
part of the complexity of timing analysis for software is shifted from ILP solving
to SAT solving. In our combined approach, the power of modern SAT solvers is
utilized to obtain a precise and compact model of the reachable program paths. We
show how this can be used to simplify timing analysis substantially. Augmenting
program netlists by precise timing information allows for a more accurate estimate
of the software’s access behavior as seen by the peripheral. This can potentially
reduce the complexity of ACCESS-local equivalence checks or even pave the
way towards cycle-accurate formal co-verification by equivalence checking and
property checking.
How much this can affect the overall run time of the proposed co-verification has
to be determined in future work.
Performing any kind of optimization with confidence requires a suitable method to
verify the result. With ACCESS, this thesis provides such a method, enabling to
verify the correctness of equivalence transformations defined across the boundaries
of hardware and software.
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Durch kontinuierlich steigende Anforderungen an Rechneranwendungen im Bere-
ich des Internet of Things (IoT) ergeben sich neue Möglichkeiten im Technolo-
giefeld eingebetteter Systeme. Gleichzeitig steigt hierdurch jedoch der bereits beste-
hende Anforderungsdruck im Entwurfs- und Produktionsprozess. Eine Vielzahl
der durch IoT-Technologien angestrebten Ziele sind nur dann realisierbar, wenn
die zur Umsetzung notwendigen Geräte günstige Entwurfs- und Produktionskosten
mit hoher Effizienz vereinen.
Eine verbreitete und bewährte Strategie zur Reduktion der Entwurfskosten liegt in
der Wiederverwendung bereits existierender Hardware- und Softwarekomponenten.
Dies führt jedoch häufig dazu, dass die engen Ressourcenbeschränkungen des
Projektes aufgrund nicht optimal aufeinander abgestimmter Komponenten nicht
eingehalten werden können.
Ein signifikanter Anteil der Chipfläche eines einebetteten Systems wird von dessen
Speicher eingenommen. Desto mehr das System auf Software zur Implementierung
seiner eigentlichen Funktion setzt, desto größer ist die benötigte Chipfläche für
Speicher in Relation zum Rest des Systems. Dies hat somit unmittelbaren Ein-
fluss auf die Produktionskosten sowie den Energieverbrauch des Systems. Eine
Möglichkeit zur Reduktion des benötigen Programmspeichers eines Systems liegt
darin, die Schnittstellen zwischen Hard- und Software aufeinander abzustimmen,
zu optimieren und, falls möglich, zu vereinheitlichen. Solche Schnittstellen werden
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i.d.R. in der Software durch Memory Mapped I/O realisiert und auf dedizierte
Treiber für das jeweilige Peripheriegerät verteilt.
Eine Vereinheitlichung der Zugriffsmethoden erhöht die Möglichkeit einzelne Teile
eines Treibers zur Ansteuerung mehrerer Peripheriegeräte wiederzuverwenden.
Dies wirkt sich positiv auf die Größe der Software und somit direkt auf die Größe
des benötigten Programmspeichers aus. Weiterhin kann eine Optimierung der
verwendeten Zugriffssequenzen zu einer Reduktion des Energiebedarfs führen.
Allerdings gilt es hierbei auszuschließen, dass durch solche Veränderungen das
funktionale Verhalten des Systems beeinflusst wird. Veränderungen an der Kom-
munikationsschnittstelle zwischen Hardware und Software führen per Definition
dazu, dass sich, in Isolation betrachtet, weder Hard- noch Software äquivalent
zur Originalversion verhalten müssen. Berücksichtigt man nun zusätzlich, dass
Kommunikation zwischen Hard- und Softwarekomponenten komplexe zeitliche
Abfolgen, Protokolle und mögliche Seiteneffekte beachten muss, so erkennt man
die Notwendigkeit automatisierter Prozesse zur Umsetzung und Verifikation be-
sagter Optimierungen.
Eine Methode zur Optimierung der Peripherieschnittstellen wird in [43] präsentiert.
Die dort vorgestellten Prozesse führen typischerweise zu einer lokalen Veränderung
des Ein-/Ausgabeverhaltens der Software, jedoch ohne dabei deren globalen Kon-
trollfluss zu verändern.
Aus der vorangegangenen Diskussion sollte jedoch ersichtlich sein, dass gängige
Verifikationsverfahren, welche Hardware und Software separat betrachten, den
Anforderungen zur Verifikation dieser Veränderungen nicht genügen. Es wird ein
Verifikationsverfahren benötigt, dass nicht nur die Software, sondern auch deren
detaillierten Effekt auf die angesteuerte Hardware berücksichtigt. Für den allge-
meinen Fall bedeuted dies einen Beweis der Hardware/Software Co-Äquivalenz
modulo Latenzzeit über die gesamte Laufzeit der Software. Für realistische in-
dustrielle Anwendungen stellt dies jedoch eine nicht zu bewältigende Aufgabe
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dar.
In dieser Arbeit wird ein neuer formaler Ansatz zur Bewältigung dieses Problems
für Fälle, wie sie durch die Klasse der Optimierungen wie sie von [43] erzeugt wer-
den, diskutiert. Der vorgeschlagene Ansatz nutzt die Lokalität der eingebrachten
Änderungen zur Partitionierung des Gesamtproblems in handhabbare Teilprob-
leme aus. Jedes Teilproblem der Partitionierung wird unter dem Kontext der bis
dahin möglichen Programmhistorie gelöst. Durch eine Überapproximation des
möglichen Zustandsraums des Peripheriegeräts zu Beginn eines lokalen Beweises,
können diese Einzelbeweise verkettet und die Äquivalenz des Gesamtsystems als
Komposition der Äquivalenz der Einzelbeweise geschlossen werden.
In ACCESS wird hierfür ein HW/SW-Modell des zu verifizierenden Systems
vorgestellt, welches jeweils ein Modell der Hardware, der Software und eine
Abstraktion des zwischengeschalteten Bussystems integriert. Für jede dieser in-
tegrierten Komponenten werden mögliche Modellierungen auf unterschiedlichen
Abstraktionsebenen vorgestellt. Der jeweilige Effekt dieser Modellierungen auf
ACCESS, sowie die allgemeine Durchführbarkeit und Leistungsfähigkeit der Veri-
fikationsmethode, wird anhand dreier Fallstudien sowie mehrerer Leistungstests
untersucht.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen die Anwendbarkeit von ACCESS für realistische Anwen-
dungen im üblichen Größenbereich von IoT-Anwendungen. Zusätzlich hat sich
ACCESS als besonders effektiv im Auffinden subtiler Bugs der Peripheriehardware
erwiesen.
Es konnte kein signifikanter Effekt der vorgestellten Modellierungsebenen des
Bussystems, sowie der Software, auf die Skalierbarkeit und Leistungsfähigkeit
der Methode nachgewiesen werden. Die Verwendung eines SystemC-PPA Models
gegenüber des RTL Models der Hardware zeigte hingegen deutliche Verbesserung
in der benötigten Zeit zur Durchführung der Beweise.
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Die Methode würde somit stark von einer besseren Integration von SystemC-
PPA in kommerzielle Software-Tools, bzw. eine besser auf diese abgestimmte
Modellierung der SystemC-PPA Modelle profitieren.
Abschließend wird eine optionale Methode zu zyklenakkuraten Timing-Analyse
auf Basis von Programmnetzlisten vorgestellt. Die Ergebnisse dieser Methode
können zu einer verbesserten Konfiguration der Beweisparameter beitragen und
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